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Modern warfare is predicated on the availability of reliable information and data 
flows. Insofar as weapon systems must be effective, so too must the networks that 
undergird them. However, while a fighter jet’s range, a missile’s accuracy, or a ship’s 
speed are relatively easy to quantify, great difficultly lies in delineating measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) for supporting commanders’ decision-making, both in planning and 
in execution. To that end, Navy leadership has expended much effort in helping integrate 
the relevant organizations for command and control (C2) into a more cohesive structure. 
In particular, the realignment of the Navy’s intelligence (N2) and command, control, 
communications, and computers (N6) directorates were, in the words of Admiral Gary 
Roughead, “…the right way, this is where we have to go, and it will make us much, much 
more effective.”(Roughead 2009) What remains to be seen, however, is how we will get 
to this desired end-state of a network being fully supportive of a commander’s decision 
cycle. 
The members of Cohort 311-092W from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command were tasked to develop and define Measures of Performance (MOP), MOE 
and Quality of Service (QoS) characteristics required by Naval networks to support Fleet 
Battle Management.  Findings will be used to support one of the fifteen Information 
Dominance Roadmaps directed by Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information 
Superiority.  In particular the DCNO objectives are to: 
“Pioneer, field and employ game-changing capabilities to ensure 
Information Dominance over adversaries and Decision Superiority for 
commanders, operational forces and the nation.”(Department of the Navy, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance 2010) 
The project team employed a model-based systems engineering approach to 
document the requirements, define the operational architecture, define high level 
functions that the networks must support, and model different system of system 
alternatives. Naval Warfare Publications, Navy Tactics, Technique and Procedure 
Publications and leadership writing were analyzed to refine a set of coincide technical 
 ix 
performance measure that naval networks need to satisfy to support Fleet Battle 
Management. These key measures are:  
a. Delay time for propagation of vital situational awareness information 
throughout the network 
b. Percentage of time soft-real-time requirements that can be maintained 
throughout the network 
c. Percentage of time hard-real-time requirements that can be maintained 
throughout the network 
Fleet stakeholders were engaged throughout the process to develop a value system based 
on these concise measures that was used to analyze these alternatives.  
The project team researched how other industries might address the issue of 
meeting the key measures.  It was discovered that the Global banking System employs 
architectures and technology in order to address many of the same requirements. A 
concept of a transaction Clearing House was identified as an alternative way to build 
trusted transactions between operational nodes enhancing Command and control and 
improving fleet battle management 
The project developed a representation of the operational functional architecture 
using the Vitech CORE system engineering toolset.  A huge advantage to this approach is 
the ability to model the effect of operational activities and organization with respect to 
meeting the key measures.  A significant finding was that the organizational construct 
had significant impact on how well Fleet Battle Management can be supported.   
The Joint Communication Simulation System (JCSS) toolset was utilized to 
develop a physically representative model to understand how different networking 
architectures could be employed.  Since there are copious alternatives to model, a Design 
of Experiments approach was adopted to obtain data on several significant permutations 
with data extrapolation used to score effectiveness of some solutions. 
The project team performed a cost analysis and assessment of risk, both from 
aspect of vulnerability to operational threats and cost/schedule/performance 
considerations to all alternatives. A summary of the key findings along with areas for 
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I. PROJECT INTRODUCTION 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Fleet Battle Management (FBM) technologies, tactics, processes and procedures 
may benefit from the incorporation of some of the “game changing” transformational 
technologies articulated in the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Information Dominance 
vision. However this vision has not been evaluated with systems engineering rigor.  
Proper evaluation requires the definition of measures of performance (MOPs) and 
technical performance measures (TPMs) associated with FBM success, the identification 
of gaps or shortfalls in current and programmed approaches, development of sufficiently 
detailed architectural alternatives, the construction of performance models, and the 
performance of high-level analyses and optimization of candidate solutions for both 
capability and Total Ownership Cost. 
This project examines the MOP, MOE, and Quality of Service (QoS) 
characteristics required to support an Agile and Network-Centric Command and Control 
organization. The spectrum of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, 
Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations will be examined. 
 
B. PROJECT SCOPING AND REFINEMENT 
This Capstone Project topic is a refined objective that took several iterations, 
divided below three major phases. 
1. Original Objectives 
The topic was selected to support the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (DCNO) for 
Information Dominance (N2/N6) roadmap effort.  Under this effort, the DCNO has 





Table 1 - Information Dominance Roadmaps [After Department of the Navy, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance 2010] 
Undersea Dominance Integrated Surface Sensors 
Every sensor is networked Electromagnetic Spectrum 
Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense 
Command and Control 
Air Dominance 
Maritime Domain Awareness Strike Command and Control 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance 
Decision Superiority 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Spectrum Usage 
Cyber Convergence to a Single network 
Fleet Battle Management 
 
The topic of this Capstone will focus on the Fleet Battle Management capability, broadly 
defined as:   
“Derive a process and architecture that allows for optimal employment of 
resources. Include the ability to support C2 from the location that best 
meets mission needs, is responsive to changes in the operating 
environment and maintains commander’s intent.”(Department of the 
Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance 
2010)  
 
As partly shaped by Dr. Bill Rix from the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command, the hypothesis that Fleet Battle Management (FBM) technologies, tactics, 
processes and procedures may benefit from the incorporation of some of the “game 
changing” transformational technologies articulated in the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Information Dominance vision has not been evaluated within the model based 
systems engineering framework and its accompanying rigor. Proper evaluation would 
require the definition of MOPs and TPMs associated with FBM success, the 
identification of gaps or shortfalls in current and programmed approaches, development 
of sufficiently detailed architectural alternatives, the construction of performance models, 
 3 
and the performance of high-level analyses and optimization of candidate solutions for 
both capability and Total Ownership Cost. 
US Navy doctrine recognizes the key role Command and Control plays in the 
combat effectiveness of military forces.  Naval Doctrine Publication 1 also relates the 
concepts of Command and Control with battle space dominance: 
“Modern battlespace is multidimensional. Navy and Marine Corps 
operations encompass air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and time. 
Dominance of these dimensions continues to be an important factor in the 
survival and combat effectiveness of our force. Command and control 
integrates ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground forces, so their full range 
of capabilities can be extended effectively throughout our 
battlespace.”(Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations 1994) 
 
In this same publication, the need for integrated Command and Control systems is 
discussed as an enabler for enhanced fleet battle management capability:  
“Integrating global C4I systems that directly link and support naval forces 
and joint forces will provide us an accurate picture of the battlespace. 
Some C4I operational capabilities include: enhanced battle management 
systems; fully interoperable, user centered, multimedia (voice, video, and 
data) links; embedded cryptographic security; and the ability to collect, 
evaluate, disseminate, and receive near-real-time, all-source, fused 
intelligence and surveillance data.”(Department of the Navy, Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations 1994) 
 
As natural as it would seem to couple Naval Command and Control capability 
(and therefore fleet battle management) to communications and network capability, it is 
important to ensure that operational organization is considered as part of the problem 
domain. In a 1915 article in Proceedings, Commodore Dudley Knox (then a Lieutenant 
Commander) addressed this aspect in three-thousand word essay concerning naval 
doctrine, stating: 
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“Good leadership or command, as distinguished from administrative 
management, is then obviously a cardinal requisite to successful military 
operations. It properly includes not alone the efficiency of the person in 
chief command, but also that of the chain of subordinate commanders 
which theoretically connects the mind of the chief to each individual in the 
fleet or army. Command implies control and direction by a leader; but 
before this is possible with a large number of units, they must be divided 
into groups, each under the command of a subordinate leader. Each group 
may be again similarly subdivided and commanded, and if the force be 
large it may be necessary to repeat the process of subdivision many times. 
By means of such a so-called “chain of command” it becomes possible to 
carry into execution the will of the highest leader in a manner which could 
not otherwise be done, and to ensure that the entire organization acts 
coordinately and harmoniously as a unit.”(Knox 1915) 
 
This theme is also addressed in more recent writings by the DoD Command and 
Control Research Program (CCRP) in their various publications. In a recent book 
addressing agile command and control, it is noted that: 
“The challenge to the military is not so much to make its fighting 
structures more networkable, since they are inherently so already, but to 
ensure that the way forces are commanded and controlled, and policies are 
formed, are coherent and similarly adaptive and agile to the forces they 
command. Put simply, such complex systems cannot be controlled, and to 
attempt to do so would be to deny the network its fidelity, agility, and 
trusts to do the right thing.”(Atkinson and Moffat 2005) 
 
2.  First Level of Refinement 
A key consideration for the project team to understand how to refine the problem 
statement was to understand how the Navy has changed. Traditionally operational 
commander would deploy naval Forces with little or poor communications capability. 
“Navy operational commanders routinely have provided tactical forces 
direction and guidance through a clear statement of commander’s intent 
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that defines the “who” and “what, “explains the “why,” and establishes the 
boundary conditions for the “when” and “where” tactical action shall 
occur.  These Navy operational commanders rely on the initiative of their 
subordinate commanders to define the “how” the action will occur.  It is 
expected that subordinate commanders will exercise initiative and act in a 
manner that does not depart unnecessarily from standard procedures, 
practices, or intrusions (i.e. doctrine) and satisfies the fleet commander’s 
stated intent while ensuring coordination with other elements of the 
force.”(Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
2008a) 
 
As the Naval force becomes networked, a new paradigm has emerged where the 
operational commander is now in a better position to balance risk and opportunities as 
well as virtually participate in the battle to provide value added direction and information.   
“The revolution in information systems and the rise of networked, globally 
connected forces has changed the command and control (C2) of forces in 
the traditional maritime domain. No longer is the maritime operational 
commander disconnected from tactical forces at sea.  This new ability to 
reliably share information with tactical commander forces after they have 
commences acting on operational tasking opens new opportunities for the 
operational commander to define acceptable risk and to better integrate 
and synchronize force action in a maritime control area of operations 
(AO), OA, joint operations area (JOA), or theater operations.”(Department 
of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008a) 
 
Research into the various aspects of communications and doctrine that help or 
hinder battle operations in the network environment is a rich area of study.  The project 
purposely refined the topic down to research and evaluation of Network QoS required by 
tactical and operational commanders to accomplish netted C2 and battle management.  
Very simply, the focus became what is the QoS required for Navy networks to support 
the objectives of both the operational and tactical commander of networked naval forces? 
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3. Final Focus Areas 
The project team realized that there is a difference between characterizing design 
metrics for the network components and defining metrics for overall effectiveness of the 
networked force. In the web services community this is becoming more widely 
understood as Service Level Expectations or Quality of Experience. 
“…distinction between Quality of Experience (QoE) and QoS in the web 
environment, by pointing out that while QoS parameters are under full 
control of the service provider (e.g., throughput, server availability), QoE 
parameters, even if closely related to QoS parameter, may be influenced 
(i) by subjective elements related to user history and preferences, and (ii) 
by any system interposed between the provider and the user. … the QoE 
of a user surfing the web using a browser through an Internet Service 
Provider is lightly affected by network latency and highly affected by 
network bandwidth.”(Marchetti, Pernici, and Plebani 2004, 48-54) 
 
This project proposes a set of MOEs for networked forces that address the Quality 
of Experience or the Service Level Expectations (SLEs) of the operational and tactical 
commander to effectively exercise fleet battle management and command and control in 
a network centric environment.  
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II. PROJECT APPROACH AND DELIVERABLES 
A. PROJECT TEAM  
The project team consists of ten members with varied experiences and knowledge 
to offer to this capstone project.  The members reside in two different geographical 
locations, six members from San Diego, California and four members are from 
Charleston, South Carolina.   
Roles and responsibilities were divided into Project Management and Systems 
Engineering categories as explained in Project Management and System Engineering 
plan, Appendix A.  
The original roles and responsibilities were initially assigned so that both geographic 
locations had similar roles. However, for efficacy and efficiency reasons, the roles and 
responsibilities were adapted to maximize local team productivity and to minimize the 
risk of schedule delays. The updated roles and responsibilities are below shown in Table 
2. 
Table 2 - Project Engineering Roles 
Role Member Key Responsibilities 
Team Lead Stewart Hall 
• Act as single POC for Team 
• Lead Planning 
• Stakeholder Engagement and 
Communications 
Team Co-Lead Steve Roa 
• Act as Backup POC for Team 
• Assist Lead Planning 





• Maintain Project Schedules 
• Monitor Critical Path Activities 







• Risk identification 
• Risk Analysis 
• Risk monitoring 
• Risk Reporting 
Librarian 
Ben McCoy          
Roger Gray 
• Maintain Sakai website 
• Maintain data repository 






• Assembly of Deliverables  
• Administer quality control 




• Act as primary POC for Charleston team 
to help with coordination 
 
In the next paragraph provides a description of the actual project structure and 
management philosophy 
 
B. PROJECT CYCLE 
To ensure success, the project team adopted a development cycle to organize 
progress as described in Visualizing Project Management. The project was divided into 
four broad phases:  
• research and problem refinement  
• architecture and analysis 
• form conclusions & recommendations 
• report results 
For each of these phases decision gates were incorporated giving opportunity to obtain 
feedback from stakeholders and NPS advisors. The status of the phases was presented to 
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the stakeholders at Interim Progress Report (IPR) sessions. Throughout the duration of 
the project, standard project management practices were employed such as: 
• Project Risk Management 
• Project Integrated Master Scheduling 
• Communications Planning 
• Collaboration and File sharing 
• Stakeholder communications 
• Issues Management 
• Configuration Management 
• Data Management 
In the end, this report provides recommendations, recommendations, and potential topics 
for future research. The complete Project Management and Systems Engineering Plan for 
this project is contained in Appendix A. The next paragraph describes the systems 




Figure 1 - Project Cycle 
 
C. SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The team examined different systems engineering processes models to apply to 
this project.  
• Classic “V” model as taught in many Defense Acquisition University 
classes 
• The architecture based approach described in Steven Dam’s text on DoD 
architecture framework (Dam 2006) 
• The INCOSE SIMILAR process modeled after the 7 classic systems 
engineering functions of seven tasks: State the problem, Investigate 
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alternatives, Model the system, Integrate, Launch the system, Assess 
performance, and Re-evaluate (INCOSE 2006) 
• The system engineering approach proposed by Kossiakoff and Sweet in 
Systems Engineering; Principles and Practices (Kossiakoff and Sweet 
2003) 
The project team decided to base their SEDP on a tailored version of the approach 
proposed by Steven Dam. Figure 2 illustrates the tailored process used for this project.  
 
Figure 2 – Project Tailored SEDP [After Dam 2006] 
 
The process steps are color coded to show their relation to the phases defined in the 
overall project cycle. The figure also demoinstrates start, completion, and duration in 
time for each process step. A brief discussion of the activities and products generated in 
each process step is provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
1. Step 1:   Capture and Analyze Related Document 
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During this step, the project team researched available documentation to refine the 
problem statement.  Documentation consulted included, Navy Warfare Publications, 
Tactical Techniques and Procedures, Universal Navy task lists, Chief of Naval 
Operations vision statements, technical journals, networking references and several 
banking industry resources. The project team goal was not only to ensure they understood 
the operational context but explored other sources in science and industry that could offer 
alternative approaches. 
 
2. Step 2:   Identify Assumptions & Constraints  
During this step the project team consulted stakeholders and advisors to ensure 
the project scope was adequate. This process while was the second step initiated, was a 
process that continued throughout most of the system engineering activities. The project 
team remained in contact with stakeholders and advisors to ensure buy-in an assumptions 
and constraints. 
 
3. Step 3:   Develop the Operational Context  
Steven Dam recommends drafting the operational context early and so does this 
project team (Dam 2006). The operational context grew, morphed, and changed shape 
numerous times during the project execution. 
 
4. Step 4:   Develop Value System 
During this step, the project developed a set a weighted measures to be used to 
rank options. Operational requirements and interchanges with fleet stakeholders derived a 
set of measures. A numerical method was employed to rank the measures according to 
user’s perceived value. 
 
5. Step 5:   Develop Effective Need Statement 
During this step, the project team synthesized research findings and requirements 
to form a revised problem statement (Miller 2009). This statement would continue to be 
revised based on understanding and findings from practically the entire system 
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engineering effort. In effect the final effective need statement became the embodiment of 
all of the research and analysis performed. 
 
6. Step 6:   Develop Operational Scenarios 
Dam describes in his book the challenge with deciding what specific scenarios 
should be used to perform analysis (Dam 2006). The project team had to continually 
debate this as there was a tendency to want to build complex and realistic scenarios to 
understand the behavior of the operational nodes and systems involved. The team had to 
continually ask itself the following questions: 
• What am I trying to understand? 
• What will my data show 
• Will this data provide any information that helps to discriminate between 
options? 
The project team employed a Design of Experiments approach to limit scope and 
complexity of scenarios to be used in the analysis. 
 
7. Step 7:   Perform Functional Analysis  
Steven Dam describes this step as the “art of system engineering” (Dam 2006).  In 
this step the project team created Function Flow Block Diagrams (FFBD) to define the 
functional activities at each operational node. FFBD were chosen primarily because the 
documentation available described the operational task in terms of activities to be 
performed, and not data transformation. The other aspect is that once these FFBD were 
created, the project team could simulate the operational requirements using the Vitech 
COREsim toolset. 
 
8. Step 8:   Propose Options 
 Typically this process looks to provide one or more options at the very end of the 
project. This project is no exception in that they are provided (finally) at the end.  
However to limit overly zealous analytical excursions on such a broad topic, intermediate 
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results for the functional analysis step were used to shape and define the necessary set of 
options that would be explored in follow-on modeling efforts and trade-off analysis. This 
allowed the project team to begin on the final analysis products as a parallel effort. This 
decision was not without calculated risk as the parallel efforts could diverge. 
 
9. Step 9:   Perform Dynamic Analysis 
During this step the project team looked at how well each of the proposed 
alternatives would perform based on a projected use of fleet resources (in this case a 
combination of network and satellite communications capacity). The team used a 
comparative analysis technique to avoid issues of data classification since discussing 
actual communications capacity and actual traffic would potentially be disclosing fleet 
capabilities and limitations. This step was be used to define “goodness” of each 
alternative relative to the customer value system. 
 
10. Step 10:   Conduct Trade-offs  
In the final step of the SEDP, the team evaluated effectives based on the value 
system against cost and risk to make final recommendations 
 
D. PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS 
Stakeholders were chosen because of their interest in DCNO investment strategies 
for Fleet Battle Management. Stakeholders included members of both the operational and 
acquisition community. Table 3 identifies the stakeholders consulted and their respective 
roles relative to the Capstone team. 
 
Table 3 - Project Stakeholders and Roles 
Stakeholder Interest 




US Navy CyberForces (N8) Overall Findings 
Lifecycle Cost Estimation 
Value System 
OPNAV N2N6F42 Study customer 
Overall Findings 
Lifecycle Cost Estimation 
DASN C4I Overall Findings 
Lifecycle Cost Estimation 
PEO C4I Overall Findings 
Life Cycle Cost Estimates 
SPAWAR 5.0 Overall Findings 
Functional Models 
Topics for Future Research 
 
 
The stakeholders were consulted via e-mail, telephone, and face-to-face 
discussions to establish the baseline representation of current implementations of 
situation awareness information distribution architectures. The relative merits and 
perceived merits of various alternatives were also discussed. In addition to the interaction 
with these stakeholders, information was gathered from numerous published articles and 
documents. 
The next paragraph outlines the expected project deliverables that will be 
provided to stakeholders, advisors and NPS during the course of the project. 
 
E. PROJECT DELIVERABLES  
The team established conclusions and recommendation based on observations 
from the models and a review of the life cycle costs associated with each model.   
Consequently, the associated deliverables for this project are as follows: 
• System Engineering/Project Management Plan 
• Project Schedule 
• In-Progress Review 1 Briefing materials 
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• In-Progress Review 2 Briefing materials 
• CORE models of the As-Is and To-Be functional architectures 
• JCSS Models of the As-Is and To-Be Physical Architectures 
• Summary Report of Research and Analysis 
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III. RESEARCH PHASE - BASIC RESEARCH 
A. NAVY TASK LISTS 
The project team researched Navy tasks applicable for command and control in 
the Universal Naval Task List (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations 2008b). The UNTLS provided valuable insight to how specific measures are 
developed to measure mission success. The following tables are digests of applicable 
UNTLs: 
 
Table 4 - NTA 5.1.1 Communicate Information 
M
1  
Percent Of the time, subordinate commanders in communication with 
OTC during execution. 
M
2 
inutes  Lag between the commander’s common picture of the battle 
space and real world. 
M
3 
Percent Of time, desired communications path available. 
 
Table 5 - NTA 5.1.1.1 Transmit and Receive Information 
1  Percent Of the time, subordinate commanders in communication with 
OTC during execution. 
2 Minutes Lag between the commander’s common picture of the battle 
space and real world. 
 
Table 6 - NTA 5.1.1.1.1 Provide Internal Communications 
1  Percent Of time, desired communications path available. 
2 Minutes Lag between commander’s common picture of the battle space 
and real world. 
3 Percent Link data efficiency. 
 
 
Table 7 - NTA 5.1.1.1.2 Provide External Communications 
1  Minutes Without communications path to higher authority during 24 
hour period. 
2 Percent SIPRNET communications accessibility. 
 
Table 8 - NTA 5.1.1.1.2.1 Receive and Transmit Force Orders 
1  Percent Of addressees received messages. 
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2 Percent Of the time, subordinate commanders in communication with 
OTC during execution. 
3 Percent Of time, desired communications path available. 
 
Table 9 - NTA 5.1.1.1.2.2 Relay Communications 
1  Number Messages relayed. 
2 Minutes To relay required messages. 
3 Percent Correct messages received. 
 
Table 10 - NTA 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information 
1  Percent Of C4I resources required to support force redeployment 
identified. 
2 Percent Of time, force maintained voice and data communications 
(unsecure and secure). 
3 Percent Of C2 nodes have all required communications capabilities. 
 
Table 11 - NTA Mapping to Value Elements 
NTA Value Element 
5.1.1 Provide Effective SA over the Network 
5.1.1.1 Provide Operational Quality SA 
5.1.1.1.1 Provide Tactical Quality SA 
5.1.1.1.2 Maintain Suitable Network Reliability 
5.1.1.1.2.1 Provide Tactical Command 
5.1.1.1.2.2 Provide Tactical Quality SA, Provide Tactical Command 
5.1.2 Provide Network Availability, Provide Network Survivability 
 
These UNTLs, were used latter in the SEDP to create a value system and 
functional model for performing network Agile C2. The next paragraph discusses how 
the Common Operational Picture capability is key technology for maintaining C2 in the 
seam between Navy operational command and tactical command 
 
B. COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE 
The Common Operational Picture (COP) is the key situational awareness tool for 
Naval operational commanders. From the Global Command and Control System 
Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements: 
“[C]ommon operational picture - 1. The common operational picture is a 
distributed data processing and exchange environment for developing a 
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dynamic database of objects, allowing each user to filter and contribute to 
this database, according to the user’s area of responsibility and command 
role. The common operational picture provides the integrated capability to 
receive, correlate, and display a common tactical picture, including 
planning applications and theater-generated overlays and projections (i.e., 
environmental, battle plans, force position projections). Overlays and 
projections may include location of friendly, hostile, and neutral units, 
assets, and reference points. The common operational picture may include 
information relevant to the tactical and strategic level of command. This 
includes, but is not limited to, any geographically oriented data, planning 
data from Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, readiness data 
from  Global Status of Resources and Training System, intelligence 
(including imagery overlays), reconnaissance data, environmental (air, 
land, sea, and space), predictions of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
fallout, and air tasking order data. 2. A single identical display of relevant 
information shared by more than one command. A common operational 
picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve 
situational awareness.” 
 
From the same document, the significance of the role of the COP was described as: 
“COP is a distributed data processing and exchange environment for 
developing a dynamic database of objects, allowing each user to filter and 
contribute to this database according to the user’s area of responsibility 
and command role. It is a key tool for commanders in planning and 
conducting joint operations and in monitoring execution and coordinating 
joint operations across combatant commands. The COP enhances the flow 
of information among the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and combatant 
commanders (CCDRs), both supplementing and amplifying theater 
commander’s situation reports (SITREPs), operational reports (OPREP), 
and other reports outlined in reference a. The COP is a tool for sharing 
critical standing and situation dependent information across combatant 
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commands to achieve success in the spectrum of operations.”(Department 
of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008) 
 
The next section discusses how navy afloat tactical commanders must rely on the 
Navy satellite communication systems to maintain network connectivity  
  
C. NAVY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 
The project team researched naval communications and network architectures. In 
the maritime environment, naval units rely heavily on satellite communication link to 
prove TCP/IP transport for COP database interactions. Figure 3 illustrates the significant 
touch points of COP traffic between ashore and afloat nodes. 
 
Figure 3 - Ashore to Afloat Communication Nodes 
 
The operational commander at the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) is 
connected to other Joint operational nodes and coordinating agencies typically through 
terrestrial networking systems. Communications between the operational commander and 
the CTF commanders occurs over SATCOM. For this traffic, the information travels 
from the MOC through a Network Operations Center (NOC) to a Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS). More detailed Operational Event 
Trace Diagrams are provided in Appendix E. 
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The next paragraph summarizes research finding from the financial industry.  
Interestingly enough, world banking systems treat processing delays as risk. The project 
team researched into how banking and financial systems mange transaction delay and if 
this could be applied to fleet battle management. 
 
D. RESEARCH INTO BANKING ARCHITECTURE  
Several research paths/cycles in defining Command and Control (C2) and 
defining Fleet Battle Management (FBM) led the team to examine the applicability of 
industry information transfer models to Quality of Service (QoS) requirements and 
implications for Agile C2.  This report examined the banking industry, known for its 
exacting command and control requirements, specifically real-time gross settlement 
systems. For ease of exposition, the Bank for International Settlements definition follows:  
“A Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System can be defined as a gross 
settlement system in which both processing and final settlement of funds 
transfers (based on instructions received from payer bank/institution) takes 
place continuously (i.e., in real time). As it is a gross settlement system, 
the transactions are settled individually without netting debits against 
credits. As it is a real time settlement system, the final settlement of funds 
is effected by the system continuously rather than periodically at pre-
specified times.” (Lucas 1997) 
 
Additional background on this follows in the Research in Banking Models section. The 
RTGS method defines four alternative transaction methods based on different needs and 
situations. They are referred to as: V, Y, T and L Shaped transaction methods. Figures 1, 











 Figure 4 - V-Shaped RTGS System [From Lucas 1997] 
 
These methods could be applied to maritime MOC/ Strike group/ or unit of action 
type of framework for purposes of modeling analysis.  Further, these methods may also 
map to queuing processing models FIFO or priority processing schemes and their overall 
effect across the battle force.  By discussing how services can scale to improve QoS and 
to optimize available resources by varying membership categories, a game-changing 







    












Figure 7 - L-Shaped RTGS System [From Lucas 1997] 
 
As noted in the literature:  
“Interbank payment and securities settlement mechanisms are the main 
facilities for transferring monetary claims and assets between financial 
institutions. These systems transfer many times the value transferred by 
cash instruments or retail payments.  The infrastructure has gradually 
grown into a complicated interactive network of systems that transfer 
claims and assets at the domestic and international level. Integration of 
these systems has resulted in critical interdependencies.” (Lucas 1997)  
 
Given a global economy that still depends on local economic customs and process 
organization patterns, technical solutions depend on a wide variety of configurations.  An 
important parallel can be drawn between the wide variety of payment systems suited for 
specific transaction flows for a particular state and current Navy Command and Control 
Operational network topology and mission operational constructs. Different network 
topologies are more suited to specific mission threads just as transaction processing 
systems are more suited to specific transaction flows. 
Suitability and efficiency vary for different financial systems and transaction 
depending on both time and specific geographic region. Similar problems are faced for 
measuring operational effectiveness of Navy C2 systems using existing traditional 
analysis techniques and models. These techniques and models tend to be too general and 
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often discuss less important systems’ parameters, making them inadequate to fully 
capture current Navy C2 DOTMPLF for various operational mission threads.    
Many of the same problems faced by central banks apply to Navy Command and 
Control. Using a hierarchal approach to C2 as discussed in Vice Admiral Willard’s paper, 
the pace of C2 at lower operational levels should not be constrained by higher levels 
unless absolutely necessary.  The same construct is true in bank-settlement and payment 
processing systems for various countries. This tiered system depends on a small number 
of large banks to settle on the books of a central bank, yet a large number of small 
intermediary banks settle with the facilities of the larger banks.  This multi-tiered 
structure for small banks adds processing layers and risk just as the tiered concept to the 
common operational picture adds risk to the speed of and effectiveness of Navy C2.  
Current research into flat network-based processing structures show that modern 
technology can reduce the risk for financial settlement systems. The flat or “common” 
operational picture used in bank settlement systems may reduce overall risk and provide 
and increased speed of C2. 
As noted earlier, payment and settlement systems tend to be hierarchal in 
structure.  Different transactions are handled by different systems. To reduce overall 
institutional risk and liquidity needs, a central bank can be considered as the real-time 
gross settlement system between various banks. Transaction flows between banks are 
processed by the central bank settlement system that provides an overall “common” risk 
picture for both the large and small banks. 
With a hierarchal system that integrates inputs from several different transaction 
types, transactions from one system have to be integrated and processed in another 
system. Synchronization quickly becomes a problem as transactions flow between 
various hierarchies and systems. The same approach applies to current Navy C2.  
Synchronization becomes a problem between the COCOM and CTF as information flows 
between various levels making it difficult to obtain a common operational picture. 
In the figure below a participant inputs a transaction into the settlement system 
which books and queues it for further processing. However, with a hierarchal system, 
many thousands of the similar transactions are occurring at the same time, creating the 




Figure 8 - Notional Settlement System [From Leinonen 2005, 19-23, 31-32] 
 
Applying the concept of a flat network structure to settlement processing allow 
for reduced liquidity risk for the entire system through more efficient gridlock resolution. 
For our purposes, a flat common operational (COP) picture will increase the speed of 
decisions through the centralization of the tiered COP databases from various command 
levels to a central location. Each command level will synchronize with a common COP 
database located at the Networks Operation Center. 
 
E. FINDINGS FROM BASIC RESEARCH PHASE 
The project team basic research yielded several significant findings that were 
applied to systems engineering process. 
    
1. Navy Task List Findings 
Research in to UNTLs used to measure Command and Control mission success 
showed that information delay was a key measurement parameter. Other important 
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parameters included quality of communications connectivity at what degree messages are 
correctly transmitted and received. 
 
2. Common Operational Picture  
An important finding was how the COP provides a key command and control 
capability in the seam between operational and tactical command.  
  
3. Satellites Communications Systems 
One of the research findings of the project team is that the Navy relies on 
SATCOM for network connectivity between operational and tactical commanders. This 
finding is significant in that any meaningful analysis may need to accommodate satellite 
communication system performance and not just network performance. It is possible that 
the current Navy satellite communications architecture may be a limiting factor in how 
well network centric command and control performs (and not the networks themselves). 
4. World Banking Systems 
One of the research findings of the project team is that the current information 
architectures and data transfer mechanisms employed in theater situational awareness can 




IV. RESEARCH PHASE – PROBLEM REFINEMENT 
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
A series of assumptions were made to minimize the complexity of the 
examination of the problem space and allow for a more in-depth analysis and review of 
the hypothesis.  
1. Cognitive Aspect of Fleet Battle Management 
The capstone team recognized that there is a cognitive aspect to the analysis of 
interactions and information flows in Fleet Battle Management, however, because this 
investigation was focused primarily on the functional and physical interactions and data, 
flows, it was assumed that the cognitive aspects would have a mutually cancelling effect 
when conducting comparisons of the results. While this is truly a worthwhile topic of 
research it was decided in consultation with stakeholders and project advisors, this would 
be beyond the scope of our analysis. 
 
2. Notional Functional Analysis 
A fundamental assumption made in the development of the As-Is model affected 
the functional interactions between the various echelons of command.  NWP 3-32 does 
not describe in detail the specifics of the various interactions. In addition it is recognized 
that the details of the interaction, timing, and exactly “who” in the networked needs to 
interact with “who” to accomplish: what” varies greatly on missions and adversary.  
Therefore, using available subject sources such as VADM Admiral Willard’s seminal 
article in Proceedings and requirements in NWP 3-32, a notional interaction flow was 
developed in CORE and used as the basis for building the functional modeling and 
analysis (Willard 2002). 
In addition to avoid concerns of data classification, each of the functions was 
assigned a default execution by the modeling toolsets time with a Gaussian distribution to 
minimize the variability of the effects of the information exchanges in the model.  
Whenever functions occurred at different echelons of command or modes in the 
operational architecture, the function was assumed to have a similar execution time in all 
instances (other than the random execution time assigned by the model). The treatment of 
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the functions in this manner was not deemed to have a skewing effect on the outcome, 
primarily because this was a comparative exercise. An additional series of assumptions 
were made regarding the serial nature of the interrelated processes executing in each of 
the echelon’s command and control cycle. Another assumption made was that the 
execution process in the tactical environment would be allowed to run with minimal 
intervention from the oversight echelons. 
 
3. Abstracted Details of Physical Networks 
The physical network implementation was modeled assuming consistency in 
implementation of the network at each of the nodes modeled. That is, each node was 
assumed to have the same types of equipment and that each of the communication links 
had relatively constant throughput. These assumptions allowed the team to more readily 
observe the effects of various discrete component changes in an isolated fashion. 
 
4. Tactical versus Operational Level of War 
For the analysis step, the project team decided to concentrate on the tactical 
operational level war overlap. The reasons for this were that in the tactical domain, the 
networks and information exchange requirements begin to address weapons and effects.  
This was considered outside the scope of fleet battle management. Conversely, at the 
other end of the spectrum are information requirements addressing strategic and 
operational planning. The project team decided that while exploration of these concepts 
could be interesting, it most likely would not meet the stated need of the stakeholders. 
 
5. Cost Data 
To the maximum extent possible, the project team based cost estimates for 
lifecycle costs using existing programs under the DCNO portfolio of information 
dominance programs as analogous systems.  
 
B. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT 
An operational context for fleet battle management could easily become quite 
complex. Given the accepted project constraints and assumptions, the project team 
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adopted a simplified context for this project. The context is illustrated in the OV-1 
diagram shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 - OV-1 Diagram 
 
In this Operational View a Combatant Commander stands up a Commander Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) in response to a theater situation. The CJTF then stands up a Joint 
Forces maritime Component Commander to support naval operations. The JFMCC is 
embarked ashore at the Maritime Operations Center. The JFMCC activate three 
Combined Task Force (CTF) Commanders for the tactical operations.  The CTF 
commanders are assume to be afloat. 
The physical communications and networking architecture need to be considered.  
The CJTRF and JFMCC are assumed to be ashore and connected with terrestrial 
networking systems. Communications between the JFMCC (located ashore at the MOC) 
and the CTF commanders occurs over SATCOM. For this traffic, the information travels 
from the MOC through a Network Operations Center (NOC) to a Naval Computer and 
Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS). More detailed Operational Event 
Trace Diagrams are provided in Appendix E. 
 31 
 
C. VALUE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT  
The value system design began with the effective need of providing networked 
agile command and control. The process began with researching the US Navy’s current 
capability including: Maritime warfare, tactics tips and procedures, current command and 
control infrastructure and current status of becoming a network-centric warfighter.  After 
the research, the value system was broken down into two subcomponents, Provide 
Effective Situational Awareness over the Network and Maintain Suitable Networks 
Reliability. These encapsulate the primary functions that must be achieved in order to 
provide networked agile command and control. Since operational decisions happen at a 
different rate then tactical decisions, the value hierarchy further breaks down to consider 




Figure 10 - Value Hierarchy 
 
 32 
The following paragraphs describe how the project team was able to derive 
objective and threshold values from user needs and requirements. In addition the process 
for defining the weights will be described. The weights were used as part of the decision 
analysis process that will be discussed in paragraph VII.  Further, it should be noted the 
weights in Figure 10 do not add to 100 due to rounding errors. Table 13 that follows in 
later paragraphs will have the more precisely calculated weight values. 
 
1. Operational Situational Awareness  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3151 address the need for timely 
situational awareness to be provided in the Common Operational Picture and was used to 
help establish the value system. 
“The information that the COP displays is time sensitive. The definitions 
of real time, near real time, and non-real time serve to provide a 
commander a sense of the value of information. Delays due to data 
processing, slow communications networks, or any other transparent 
delays can further degrade the value of information. Track managers and 
operators should understand the time value of data being displayed on the 
COP and communicate this to the commanders.”(Department of Defense, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008) 
 
The challenge has been (and remains today) how to define timely situational 
Awareness threshold and objective values. This is also compounded by the fact that this 
can be dependent on several factors including, mission need and physics of the sensors 
themselves. Understanding Information Age Warfare Alberts (et al) write: 
“For example, tolerable latency may be seconds (missile defense), minutes (outer 
air battle), hours (logistics close to the front), days (theater logistics), or weeks 
(mobilization). Commands often establish standards for latency depending on the 
physical limits on information capture and processing, the physics of the mission 
area, their organizational capacity, and other factors.”(Alberts et al. 2001) 
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CJSI 3151 address the objective latency requirements for the Common 
Operational Picture in Table 12, shown below.  For operational command, the objective 
track latency varies from 6 hours to 3 minutes depending on type of information (air 
tracks, surface tracks, etc). To simplify the derived value system, the project team used 
the most conservative latency for 3 minute as the objective value for operational 
situational awareness.   
Table 12 - Desired Track Latency [From CJSI 3151] 
DOMAIN FRD AFD NEU SUS HOS UNK  PND 
Surface 15 min 4 hours 6 hours 24 hours 24 hours 6 hours 0 
Subsurface 6 hour 6 hours 6 hours 24 hours 24 hours 6 hours 0 
Conventional 
Land 
4 hours 4 hours 4 hours 24 hours 24 hours 2 hours 0 
Air 3 min 3 min 3 min 3 min 3 min 3 min 0 
SOF 4 hours N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 
TBM (special) 0 0 0 6 hours 6 hours 6 hours 0 
 
2. Tactical Situational Awareness  
The values for tactical situational awareness were based on Link-16 performance.  
While actual track latency over Link-16 will vary with factors such as number of 
participating units, range of the network, track load, etc. the basic network cycle time is 
12 seconds (Department of the Navy, Navy Center for Tactical Systems Interoperability 
1996). This metric was used to form the basis for the value hierarchy. 
 
3. Operational Command  
The threshold and objective values for operational command were based on the 
values established for situational awareness.  Threshold was based on minimum latency 
value for tracks with an objective set to coincide with the minimum cycle time for link-16 
networks. 
 
4. Effective Command (Tactical Quality) 
The measures for effective tactical command have been traced to the ability o 
meet hard time deadlines for employment and coordination of weapons and effects.  The 
exact time figures are dependent on mission, sensor, weapon, effect, etc.  To mitigate any 
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concerns with data classification due to exposing navy capabilities and limitations, the 
project team chose to discuss this measure as a percentage of overall time that real-time 
deadlines are met and the percentage of time prioritization of data is conserved. 
 
D. VALUE SYSTEM WEIGHTS 
The weighting for the value system in Table 13 was developed using the swing 
weight method described in Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools. (Clemen and 
Reilly 2000). To ensure the value system reflects the fleet users, a select group of users 
with command and control expertise were selected to evaluate the value of a C2 network 
as each measure was varied from objective the threshold value.  Table 13 below reflects 
the fleet stakeholder raw scores and the normalized weights calculated for the value 
system. 
Table 13 - Value System Weights 
Value System Measure 
Stakeholder Assessment 
of Value (expressed 




Operational Situational Awareness 
set to objective value;  all other at 
threshold 9 0.209302326 
Tactical Situational Awareness set to 
objective value;  all other at 
threshold 9 0.209302326 
Operational Command set to 
objective value;  all other at 
threshold 8 0.186046512 
% For Soft Real-Time constraints 
met set to objective value;  all other 
at threshold 8 0.186046512 
% For Hard Real-Time constraints 
set to objective value;  all other at 
threshold 9 0.209302326 
 
The next section briefly describes the research into threats that project team 
considered as part of the problem refinement process.  
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E. THREAT ANALYSIS 
Due to overall concerns of data classification, the project team is unable to 
provide a detailed threat analysis. However, there are well known themes that are widely 
documented in public press that can be (and should be) applied to this problem statement. 
 
1. Cyber Attacks 
As the number of wireless systems continues to grow, and as digital systems 
began to gain more capabilities, the amount threats to the U.S. information technology 
infrastructure will continue to grow. Currently, factors such as associated costs, perceived 
need, operational requirements, and regulatory constraints, have made it difficult for 
network defense technologies to keep up with the frequent occurrences of cyber attacks 
(Blair 2010). The vulnerability of DoD networks and commercial transport backbones 
represent a threat to networked fleet battle management 
 
2. Protected Systems 
Whether the users of the military satellite communications systems are on ships, 
aircraft, or land vehicles, the architecture they use are protected by accept very low to 
moderate data rates in exchange for considerable protection of their links against 
physical, nuclear, and electronic threats. These systems that are protected in this 
architecture are the Mil-star system, Air Force Satellite Communications (AFSATCOM) 
and extremely high frequency (EHF) payloads (Martin 2002). In general Navy networked 
forces may need to be able to perform effectively with the limited capacity satellite 
communications  
 
3. Budget Cuts 
Being that the national security part of the federal budget has been predicted to 
suffer budget cuts; the Navy will most likely feel the brunt of this effect. The number of 
ships the Navy currently has is 285. The goal and previous commitment of having a 313 
ship Navy, made by the DoD, has not been reached yet. U.S. Navy platforms will 
continue to decrease in number unless budget priorities realign with national security 
interests. Reducing the force will cause additional hardships, causing an increase in 
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operational and maintenance costs. If the Navy continues to not get the support and 
funding it needs, then the ideal of other nations challenging U.S. Naval Supremacy can 
become a reality (Berube 2010). As decision makers balance the need for ships versus 
networking, it’s likely that investment in networking will see a decrease as historically it 
has been easier to defend combat effects using numbers of platforms and weapons than it 
has been top defend effectiveness of networking ability. 
 
F. EFFECTIVE NEED STATEMENT  
 
Net centric warfare poses a new series of challenges and issues in the execution of 
Agile Command and Control. In his paper to the World Congress of Engineering and 
Computer Science in 2008, Amir Shamdani establishes a thematic view of Agile 
Command and Control that is further reinforced by ADM Willard’s Naval Proceeding’s 
article albeit in an organizational context (Shamdami 2008). In his presentation, Mr. 
Shamdami postulates that Agile Command and Control is characterized by the following: 
• Developing common Situational Awareness across all participating nodes. 
• Developing collaborative planning based on commander’s intent. 
• Conducting concurrent planning and execution. 
While these activities are recognizable under traditional Command and Control 
paradigms, the project team submits that what changes in Agile Command and Control 
are the timelines under which each aspect is conducted as well as the iterative nature of 
activities 2 and 3 above.  A conclusion that Mr. Shamdami establishes in this paper, is the 
need to recognize that Net-centric warfare and Agile C2 also rely on the cognitive 
architecture associated with the network, communications, and computing architecture.  
Effective Command and Control as described by VADM Willard in his Naval 
Proceeding’s article and NWP 3-32 also recognizes this need, but establishes more 
emphasis on a robust and agile organizational information-exchange architecture. This 
architecture must be also flexible to support the continuous nature of the C2 cycle and the 
required interaction across echelons that are paramount for agile C2.   
Discussions with stakeholders from the SPAWAR Chief Engineer’s office 
established needs as articulated in the following excerpt: 
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“Fleet Battle Management (FBM) technologies, tactics, processes 
and procedures may benefit from the incorporation of some of the “game 
changing” transformational technologies articulated in the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Information Dominance vision has not been evaluated 
with systems engineering rigor.  Proper evaluation requires the definition 
of MOPs and TPMs associated with FBM success, the identification of 
gaps or shortfalls in current and programmed approaches, development of 
sufficiently detailed architectural alternatives, the construction of 
performance models, and the performance of high-level analyses and 
optimization of candidate solutions for both capability and Total 
Ownership Cost.” [emphasis added] (Rix 2010) 
 
This statement establishes a need within the Navy to identify and implement not 
only the technologies and systems required to better implement Fleet Battle Management, 
but also the mechanisms to measure, test, and optimize the implementations and 
investments made to support this effort. 
Although these needs comprised the primary focus for this project, there are other 
stakeholder needs that must be accommodated to support the effective implementation 
and sustainment of the needed warfighter capability. These additional needs address the 
need to accommodate other influences and threats affecting Navy systems. 
The need for these system capabilities must be balanced with the needs of a 
constrained fiscal environment, that is, the end solution must be affordable.  The life 
cycle costs for this implementation must not exceed available budgets, and care must be 
taken to ensure these capabilities can indeed be acquired.  In addition to ensuring that the 
solution implementation does not overwhelm fiscal budgets, it must not overwhelm 
available personnel and skill sets. System complexity for operations and maintenance 
must be abstracted from the operators and maintainers to minimize the effects of 
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V. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS  
A. BASIS FOR FUNCTIONAL MODEL 
To better understand the operational interactions for fleet battle management, a 
functional model was constructed using Vitech Core. Determination of authoritative 
sources for Command and Control requirements is not a straightforward task. Among 
Naval Commander and watch standers the opinions are varied. This is due to many 
factors: experience and training, mission specifics, and theater specific practices, are just 
a few examples. In order to complete the project in a timely manner, several references 
were employed to aid in the development of the functional architecture. These references 
look at the practice of C2 from different perspectives but are surprisingly harmonious 
with respect to articulation of functions and tasks.  
 
• “Rediscover the Art of Command & Control” by Vice Admiral Robert 
F. Willard, U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings, October 2002 
 
• Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - Navy Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures, NTTP 3-32.1 
 
• OPNAVINST 3500.38B/MCO3500.26A/USCG COMDTINST 
3500.1B, Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) 
 
• Understanding Command and Control by David S. Alberts and 
Richard E. Hayes, DoD Command and Control Research Program 
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Figure 11 - Overarching Guidance Flow to Systems Engineering 
 
It’s important for the reader to understand that there is a significant difference 
between functional requirements for Command and Control and Functional requirements 
for command and control systems. Fleet Battle Management is a human activity and such 
communication systems, networks, and command and control systems all support the 
commander’s activities. This analysis is not concerned with behavior of the command 
and control systems, rather the affect on fleet battle management by the human functions 
themselves. 
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Understanding the interactions of Command and Control functions vertical along 
echelon of command and horizontally along breadth of command is a key component to 
forming potential investment approaches for network centric fleet battle management.   
Figure 12 from NTTP-3-32 illustrates this interaction as a series of decision cycles 
working at various echelons of command simultaneously. 
 
Figure 12 - Decision Cycles [From Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations 2008] 
 
A simplified operational context is illustrated in Figure 13 and forms the basis of 
the simulation design.  For this context, a Combined Joint Task Force Commander 
(CJTF) with battle watch staff is stood up ashore to command a maritime operation.   
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Supporting the CJTF is a Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) 
embarked at a shore based Maritime Operations Center (MOC). Supporting the JFMCC 
is one to three Naval Combined Task Commanders (noted as CTF One, CTF Two, and 
CTF Three respectively). As operations commence Command and Control cycles as 




Figure 13 - Simplified Operation Context C2 Simulation 
 
 












In addition the simulation of the Command and Control architecture as defined in 
NTTP-3-32 the project also simulated the functional behavior utilizing the clearing house 
construct to coordinate command and situational awareness across the battle 
organization. Figure 14 illustrates the simplified operational context for this approach, in 
which a Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) with battle watch staff is stood 
up ashore to command a maritime operation just as before.    
 
 
Figure 14 - Simplified Operation Context for Clearing House C2 Simulation 
 
CJTF is a Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) embarked at a 
shore based Maritime Operations Center (MOC). Supporting the JFMCC is one to three 
Naval Combined Task Commanders (noted as CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
respectively). What is different in this approach is that all nodes are interacting with a 
single Command and Control cycle. 
 
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL  
While this model was very useful in providing insight into operational 












would like to point out the major assumptions and limitations of this model in order to 
ensure that readers of this research can accurately apply these findings. 
 
 
1.  Notional Task Durations and Notional Data 
Due to concerns with classification of the overall modeling effort, the functional 
model intentionally uses notional data exchanges and does not account for actual message 
data (i.e. message contents, message size, or data transfer times). The model also does not 
attempt to define actual task durations and instead allows CORE to assign a random task 
length (based on normal distribution) for each task. Again this was intentional as 
otherwise the model could be used to determine actual operational Capabilities and 
Limitations of Navy Command and Control. 
 
2.  Limitations due to Discrete Event Simulation Technique  
The CORE model simulation engine is a discrete event simulation process.  
Because of this, attempts to model a continuous process may not seem to be realistic in a 
sense that the modeler has to break up the continuous process in to a series of discrete 
events.  The function Provide Situational Awareness (for example) may not appear very 
realistic to the reader because in reality this is a function that is performed continuously 
through the C2 execution cycles. However, the main purpose of this model is achieved 
even with this limitation. 
 
3.  Physical Resources Limitations Were Not Considered  
The CORE model simulation engine provides the ability for the modeler to 
establish physical resource limitations on the functional model to determine if there are 
adverse affects on mission performance due to resource limitations. The CORE model 
did not attempt to consider these factors as the physical architecture is to be modeled with 
a separate modeling toolset more suited to demonstrating affects due to communications 
and networking architectures. 
 
E. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO – TRADITIONAL C2 APPROACH 
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The basic structure of the functional model for the traditional C2 approach is 
illustrated Figure 15. The Sequence of function is described below. 
 
Figure 15 - Traditional C2 Model Overview 
 
Function 1 (Perform Operations/Tactical Planning) and Function 2 (Provide AOR 
Overwatch) exist in the model to provide initial data inputs and to initiate the Command 
and Control cycle at the CJTF (Function 3: Perform CJTF Art of the C2). Function 3 
models the fundamental activities of Command and Control at the CJTF node. Figure 16 
shows how the follow functions flow: 
a. Maintain alignment 
b. Provide Situational awareness  
c. Advance the plan  
d. Comply with Procedure 
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f. Adjust Apportionment 
The reader should refer to Appendix F for larger scale diagrams illustrating the functional 
flow. 
 
Figure 16 - Typical C2 Cycle 
Once initiated the Command and Control cycle at the CJTF activates the JFMCC 
Command and Control Function (Function 4: Perform MOC Art of C2). Function 4 is an 
iterative cycle that is almost identical to the cycle described previously. Once the MOC 
Command and Control function is active, it will activate the Command and Control cycle 
at each CTF (functions 5, 6, and 7). Each of these are iterative cycles that are almost 
identical to the cycle described previously. Each Art of the C2 cycle repeats 50 times 
before terminating. Additionally, once every cycle is complete, the simulation is 
complete and the total simulation time to complete the simulation is recorded for further 
analysis. 
The reader should refer to Appendix F for larger scale diagrams illustrating the 
functional flow. Appendix F also provides more detailed definition of the functions 
performed by the CORE simulation model.   
 
F. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO–DATA CLEARING HOUSE C2 
APPROACH 
The basic structure of the functional model for the clearing house approach is 
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Figure 17 - Traditional C2 Model Overview 
Function 1 (Perform Operations/Tactical Planning) and Function 2 (Provide AOR 
Overwatch) exist in the model to provide initial data inputs and to initiate the Command 
and Control cycle at the CJTF (Function 3: Perform CJTF Art of the C2). Function 3 
models the fundamental activities of Command and Control at the CJTF node.  
Unlike the traditional C2 model, all C2 functions at various operational nodes 
synchronize simultaneously with the clearing house. The in effect allows all the 
functional activity to be performed in parallel with every C2 cycle.  Figure 18 illustrates 
how the C2 functions in the clearing house approach are modeled. 
 
 
Figure 18 - C2 Cycles with Clearing House Approach 
 
a. Each parallel cycle repeats 50 times before terminating 
b. Once cycles are complete, the simulation is complete and the total simulation 
time to complete the simulation is recorded for further analysis. Appendix D 
provides more detailed definition of the functions performed by the CORE 
simulation model.   
 
The reader should refer to Appendix F for larger scale diagrams illustrating the functional 
flow. 
 
G. ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL MODEL DATA 
Once the FFBDs were developed, the COREsim feature was used to simulate the 
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obtained demonstrated revealed how changes to the operational architecture may affect 
the commander’s ability to perform Command and Control 
a. The Analysis Process Steps 
An overview of the simulation and analysis Process is summarized in the table 
below. Appendix D contains the collected data and statistics calculations. 
 
 
Table 14 - Simulation and Analysis Steps 
Step Activity Objective 
1 Run Simulation with CJTF 
Functions (no triggers) 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF 
2 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions at the CJTF 
3 Perform T-test of data samples 
from Steps 1 and 2  
Ensure that any differences in data is 
statistically significant 
4 Run Simulation with CJTF and 
JFMCC functions working in 
parallel 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF and 
JFMCC 
5 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC and 
CJTF and between both commands) 
6 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, and CTF One functions 
working in parallel 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
and CTF One 
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Step Activity Objective 
7 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One and between all three 
commands) 
8 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two 
functions working in parallel 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One, and CTF Two 
9 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One, CTF Two and between all 
four commands) 
10 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, 
and CTF Three functions working 
in parallel 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
11 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One, CTF Two, CTF Three and 
between all five commands) 
12 Examine how functions are 
potentially delayed with depth of 
command 
Determine sensitivity of Command 
and Control performance to vertical 
levels of command 
13 Examine how functions are 
potentially delayed with breadth 
of command 
Determine sensitivity of Command 
and Control performance to 
horizontal levels of command 
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Step Activity Objective 
14 Note:   CJTF Functions using the 
Clearing House approach is 
functionally equivalent to 
analysis step 1 
 
15 Note:  simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) for 
CJTF using the Clearing House 
approach is functionally 
equivalent to analysis step 2 
 
16 Run Simulation with CJTF and 
JFMCC functions working in 
parallel using the Clearing House 
approach 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJT using the 
Clearing House approach F and 
JFMCC  
17 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) using 
the Clearing House approach 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC and 
CJTF and between both commands) 
using the Clearing House approach 
18 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, and CTF One functions 
working in parallel using the 
Clearing House approach 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
and CTF One using the Clearing 
House approach 
19 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) using 
the Clearing House approach 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One and between all three 
commands) using the Clearing House 
approach 
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Step Activity Objective 
20 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two 
functions working in parallel 
using the Clearing House 
approach 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One, and CTF Two using the 
Clearing House approach 
21 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) using 
the Clearing House approach 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One, CTF Two and between all 
four commands) using the Clearing 
House approach 
22 Run Simulation with CJTF, 
JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, 
and CTF Three functions working 
in parallel using the Clearing 
House approach 
Determine baseline time allocation to 
complete functions at CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
using the Clearing House approach 
23 Repeat simulation with data 
synchronization (triggers) using 
the Clearing House approach 
Time C2 Cycles including staff 
interactions (within JFMCC, CJTF, 
CTF One, CTF Two, CTF Three and 
between all five commands) using the 
Clearing House approach 
24 Examine how functions are 
affected by the number 
operational nodes using the 
Clearing House approach 
Determine sensitivity to number of 
nodes 
 
H. ECHELON DEPTH OF COMMAND ON TRADITIONAL C2 MODEL 
Table 15 summarizes the results of a series of simulations to demonstrate how the 
ability of command and control is affected as the command organization grows vertical 
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through several levels of command.  The simulation scenario was designed to create a 
situation whereby command staff is required to wait on data from their associate staff 
members and command staffs between levels of command. Time and delays are 
expressed in a dimensionless time unit from COREsim.    






Average Time to 




CJTF  7775.94 7856.19 80.25 
CJTF +JFMCC  7790.36 11854.29 4063.93 
CJTF+JFMCC+CTF1 7800.50 16410.25 8609.75 
 
Figure 19 illustrates the average time to complete the C2 cycles and the average 
delay created waiting for data to be passed back and forth within an operational node or 
up and down between echelons of command. Time and delays are expressed in a 























































Figure 19 - C2 Functions Performance (Depth of Command) 
  
I. ECHELON BREADTH OF COMMAND ON TRADITIONAL C2 MODEL 
Table 16 summarizes the results of a series of simulations to demonstrate how the 
ability of command and control is affected as the command organization grows 
horizontally through several levels of command. The simulation scenario was designed to 
create a situation whereby command staff is required to wait on data from their associate 
staff me members and command staffs between levels of command. Time and delays are 
expressed in a dimensionless time unit from COREsim.    
Table 16 – Impact on C2 of Increased Command Organization 
Architecture Simulated Avg. Time to 
Complete 
Task  
Avg. Time to 




CJTF +JFMCC + CTF One  7850.50 16410.25 8609.75 
CJTF +JFMCC + CTF One + CTF 
Two 
7865.90 16536.54 8670.64 
CJTF +JFMCC + CTF One + CTF 
Three 
7871.14 16605.63 8734.49 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the average time to complete the C2 cycles and the average 
delay created waiting for data to be passed back and forth within an operational node or 
up and down between echelons of command. Time and delays are expressed in a 
dimensionless time unit from COREsim.    
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Figure 20 - C2 Functions Performance (Breadth of Command) 
 
J. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Figure 21 provides a snapshot of the summary data of several series of 
simulations.  The plot illustrates the sensitivity of delays due to growth of the operational 
organization vertically and growth horizontally. Time and delays are expressed in a 
























































































Figure 21 - Summary Data 
 
K. CLEARING HOUSE C2 PERFORMANCE 
Table 17 summarizes the results of a series of simulations to demonstrate how the 
ability of command and control is affected when a clearing house approach is utilized.  
The simulation scenario was designed to create a situation whereby command staff is 
required to wait on data from their associate staff members and command staffs between 
levels of command. Time and delays are expressed in a dimensionless time unit from 
COREsim.    
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CJTF +JFMCC  8082.5 13420.11 5337.61 
CJTF +JFMCC + CTF 
One  
8202.11 15954.82 7752.71 
CJTF +JFMCC + CTF 
One + CTF Two 
8275.73 16150.14 7874.41 
CJTF +JFMCC + CTF 
One + CTF Two + 
CTF Three 
8331.25 16188.14 7856.89 
 
Figure 22 illustrates the average time to complete the C2 cycles and the average 
delay created waiting for data to be passed back and forth in the clearing house approach. 
Time and delays are expressed in a dimensionless time unit from COREsim.    
 
 




































































































L. COMPARING TRADITIONAL AND CLEARING HOUSE C2 
PERFORMANCE 
Based on the simulation data, the performance of the traditional C2 structure is 
compared to the clearing house approach. Figure 23 illustrates how Average Time to 
complete the C2 cycles compares between the traditional and clearing house approaches. 
Figure 24 illustrates how Average Delay incurred during the C2 cycles compares between 
the traditional and clearing house approaches.   
 
 







































































































Figure 24 - Comparing Avg. Delay to Complete C2 Cycle 
 
M. OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
One of the observations the project team made during development of the functional 
models was that each of the cycles tends to run at separate rates. Figure 25 shows a 
capture of CORE simulator.  Each rectangle represents execution of a function.   The top 
six rows represent the conclusion of functions belonging to the CJTF. The remainder of 
the functions belongs to the JFMCC. In this example the JMFCC cycles completed prior 
to the CJTF cycles. The reader should refer to Appendix F larger scale diagrams 








































































































Figure 25 - CORESUM Results 
 
The model purposely synchronized all the cycles to the same battle rhythm by 
using data triggers in the model. This created delay in the execution of the cycles as 
functions were created in order to wait for input from other cycles.  This highlights an 
interesting aspect of vertical C2 structure that merits more study. According to Vice 
Admiral Willard: 
“The commander's level of knowledge is the basis for control actions. If 
he lacks knowledge in any area, his control actions in that area become 
suspect. Keeping up with the operation in all six areas can be extremely 
challenging depending on the complexity of the plan. Consider the 
dynamics involved: the only area that is relatively static is "maintain 
alignment," because the mission statement and commander's intent should 
be relatively fixed frames of reference. In contrast, situational awareness, 
plan execution, procedures, enemy actions, and apportionment are 
exceedingly dynamic. 
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Now imagine the challenge in keeping up with multiple plans 
being executed concurrently. In naval operations, it is possible that plans 
for air defense, surface defense, undersea warfare, strike, information 
operations, special operations, and amphibious operations all will be 
executed at the same time. Commanders must organize their command 
centers to be able to handle oversight of multiple warfare area plans at 
once or to prioritize the plans and exert control over the most critical 
ones.”(Willard 2002) 
While VADM Willard spoke of the managing complexity and dynamics, an interesting 
finding of this functional model is that the commander may need to ensure that all of the 
cycles remain synchronized (up and down the echelon of command). Otherwise, the 
commander can find himself out of synchronization with the more tactical cycles.  
Alternatively, if the commander requires speed of execution in the more tactical cycles, 
he may be extremely challenges to keep all forces synchronized. 
 
Figure 26 - CTF C2 Cycles 
 
N. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
More 
tactical  CTF C2 Cycle 
 JFMCC C2 Cycle 




The CORE model provided several insights for the project team to show how 
Command and Control and Fleet Battle Management are affected by organizational 
structure. Additionally, the model provided significant evidence that a materiel solution 
alone may not meet the need to achieve DCNO vision for information dominance.    
1. Traditional C2 Performance 
Based on the simulation results, the traditional C2 structure appears to perform as 
well or better than the clearing house approach. However, it’s noted that performance of 
the traditional C2 organization shows marked delays as the layers of vertical organization 
grows in depth. A key consideration is to keep the C2 organization as flat as possible. 
2. Clearing House Approach 
Based on the simulation results, the clearing house C2 structure appears to 
perform well for large organization (showing less sensitivity to growth than the 
traditional C2 Model). A key consideration is that continued research into a clearing 
house approach may show benefit. 
3. Cycle Synchronization 
A very interesting by product of the project team’s effort was discovery of the 
phenomena of Command and Control cycles proceeding at different rates in a traditional 
C2 organization. This has two implications to the commander: 
• If decisions that need to be made are time sensitive, the operational 
commander may not have the most current information.  A key consideration 
is the need to push tactical command as close the tactical edge as possible. 
• For complex operations that require synchronized command at several levels 
of command echelon, the commander may need to sacrifice responsiveness 
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for the synchronization. A key consideration is the balance of speed and 
ability to synchronize command 
4. Clearing House Approach 
The model finding did not show a distinct advantage to the clearing house 
approach. However this may have been a result of applying classic C2 fundamentals 
(based on classic business and communications structures) to a newer information 
paradigm. Before a final conclusion is reached, it is worth investigating newer concepts 
for C2 organization and fleet battle management approach that takes full advantage of 
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VI. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS 
 
A.  MODELING APPROACH 
The design of the experiment was based at the component level of the existing 
network architecture where different components or characteristics of that component 
were altered, so as to see if any performance differences can be observed from those 
changes. Changes in real life environments are typically made through hardware changes 
such as the replacement of hardware, altering component characteristics, or even altering 
the network architecture. By applying the scientific method, where one independent 
variable is changed, observations can be made to see the effect of that variable.  
Complexities can occur when variables have unforeseen dependencies on others, but for 
this experimentation purpose, simple parametric changes will be concluded as being 
independent in nature. The baseline system is represented within the OPNET model as 
the “As-Is” architecture.  Changes are made, a simulated run is created and data then 
collected. Observations from the experiment are summarized and through the use of 
statistical analysis, differences from the baseline architecture can be noted and 
determined if that component change can create a significant change to the existing 
network. 
 
B. BASELINE DESCRIPTION 
The notional baseline OPNET model was created as an abstract representation of 
a theatre network.  The attempt of the baseline model was to represent the network 
architecture of current command and control implementation. The model consists of the 
following operational nodes: 
• Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
• Joint Force Maritime Combat Commander (JFMCC) 
• Command Task Forces (1, 2, 3) (CTF1, CTF2, CTF3) 
Each of the nodes had clients and servers passing database application traffic over 
a network consisting of routers and SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS terminals. Basic 
network topology consisted of single Cisco 4000 series router and a SATELLITE 
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COMMUNICATIONS link with a total capacity of 1024 Kbps. All Scenarios used a 
WSC-6 (V-5) satellite terminal. The JFMCC uses a 7505 router to handle incoming 
traffic load. The JFMCC connects to a land based CTF ashore node through an optical 
land network. 
 
Figure 27 - Operational View 
 
Command and control data traffic was represented using an application demand 
profile from JCSS. A specific database demand profile was deployed across the 
operational nodes to simulate the command and control traffic flow. As illustrated in 
Figure 28, database query response time is the time elapsed between sending a request 
and receiving the response packet. Measured from the time when the Database Query 
Application sends a request to the server and to the time that response packet is received. 
Every response packet sent from a server to the Database Query Application is included 
in the statistic. Comparing this value with traffic flow, along with other key values can 
give a collective evaluation of network performance. 
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Figure 28 - Data Base Query and Response 
 
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE MODEL 
To ensure that readers properly understand limitations of the structural model the 
assumptions and limitations are listed below.   
 
a. Actual shipboard network architecture was not modeled.  Instead, an abstraction 
of typical shipboard network architecture was implemented for modeling 
simplicity and consistency across excursions.   
b. Processing and behavior of the C2 systems were not characterized.  
Representative data flows were used rather than actual data flows.  If 
representative data flows were used, model classification would not remain 
unclassified.   
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c. A notional operational construct was assumed.  A specific communication plan or 
Operational Plan was not selected.  The chosen operational construct was used for 
simplicity of modeling.   
d. Available presets were used from the OPNET model for application demands. C2 
traffic was modeled as an application demand using a “high” traffic demand.  
e.  Simulation period was fixed at 15 minutes in order to capture a statistically 
significant number of model runs.   
f. Disconnected/ intermittent communications were not modeled.  All excursions 
assumed fully connected communication between operational nodes.   
g. Multiple satellite communications paths were not modeled. All excursions 
assumed a single Super High Frequency satellite communications link between 
operational nodes.  
h.  Not all possible Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) were modeled such 
as Plain Old Telephone System and Voice Over IP. 
i. For the experiment, email passing through the TCP layer was chosen to be a 
representative choice for simulation message exchanges from one command to 
another. Transfer times of the packet from point to point is collected indicating 
the current performance of the network. Understandably, there are many factors to 




D. MODELING SCENARIOS 
 
1. Alt_1__Router_Upgrade  
In this scenario, each of the CTF operational node routers were upgraded from a 
Cisco 4000 model series to a Cisco 7000 model series. The presumption was these 7000 





Figure 29 - Alternative 1, Router Upgrade 
   
Each of the numbered CTFs were netted together to form a mesh network.  The 
CTFs each contained an Ethernet server that represented the task force command and 
control server. Client-server exchanges between an Ethernet client workstation and 
command and control servers on other CTF platforms ensured that all platforms 
maintained an accurate COP. A detailed explanation of the network topology for this 
scenario can be found in Appendix G. Command and control data exchanges were 
created using an exponential distribution with an interarrival time of twelve seconds and 
a fixed transaction size of 32768 bytes. The output for each of the simulation runs is 
shown below in Table 20.  The mean database query time for the five-run set was 2.26 
seconds.  
 
Table 20 - Alt 1, Upgraded Routers Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 3.164327 2.115768 5.03182889 0.443066 0.196307 
2 2.143537 0.062575 4.98445366 1.473899 2.172379 
3 2.190082 0.064039 5.70666699 1.509812 2.279532 
4 0.06437 0.062575 0.09789252 0.003263 1.06E-05 






2. Alt_2__Satellite_Capacity  
In this scenario, satellite links between operational nodes were increased from a 
bandwidth of 1544 KBps to 2048 KBps. The presumption with this scenario is increased 




 Figure 30 - Alternative 2, Satellite Capacity 
 
 
The network topology was the same as the current architecture, but with 
additional satellite capacity on each of the links. A detailed explanation of the network 
topology for this scenario can be found in Appendix G. Command and control data 
exchanges were created using an exponential distribution with an interarrival time of 
twelve seconds and a fixed transaction size of 32768 bytes. The output for each of the 
simulation runs is shown below in Table 21. The mean database query time for the five-
run set was 5.75 seconds.  
 
Table 18 - Alt. 2, Satellite Capacity Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 7.143924 2.125386 47.42647 8.42142 70.92031 
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2 7.918981 2.132946 63.63215 9.640234 92.93411 
3 7.266971 0.0626 40.89453 9.294441 86.38664 
4 5.143012 0.0626 39.06716 8.088966 65.43137 
5 1.291543 0.063633 5.640359 1.673626 2.801024 
 
3. Alt_3__Router_Satellite_Upgrade (Dedicated combat Router and 
satellite capacity) 
In this scenario, C2 traffic was passed over a dedicated combat router between 
each of the operational nodes. Lower priority traffic was passed through a separate router.  
Additionally, satellite capacity was increased from 1544 Kbps to 2048 Kbps. 
 
 
Figure 31 - Alternative 3, Router & Satellite Upgrade 
 
The network topology in this scenario has the upgraded satellite links similar to 
alternative two. However, a client Ethernet workstation and SATCOM link was created 
for the non-combat traffic. A detailed explanation of the network topology for this 
scenario can be found in Appendix G. C2 data exchanges were created using an 
exponential distribution with an inter-arrival time of twelve seconds and a fixed 
transaction size of 32768 bytes. The output for each of the simulation runs is shown 
below in Table 19.  The mean database query time for the five-run set was 2.11 seconds.  
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Table 19 - Alt. 3, Router & Satellite Upgrade Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 2.277514792 0.070528 6.271971 1.652699 2.731413 
2 0.968511105 0.070528 5.26305 1.340509 1.796965 
3 2.117848808 0.070528 7.345731 1.657506 2.747327 
4 3.290351355 2.357018 5.961603 0.674542 0.455007 
5 1.937671686 0.070528 6.078935 1.445602 2.089765 
 
4. Alt_4__DiffServ (DiffServ) 
In this scenario, C2 traffic was routed using a priority queuing QoS scheme.  A 
DSCP based QoS profile was used for packet traffic. C2 traffic packets were marked for 
expedited forwarding at router interfaces. A detailed explanation of the network topology 
for this scenario can be found in Appendix G. The output for each of the five simulation 
runs is shown below in Table 20. The mean database query time for the five-run set was 
2.61 seconds.   
Table 20 - Alt. 4, DiffServ Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 3.19412994 2.103107 5.954862 0.597023 0.356437 
2 2.356829368 0.0626 7.438029 1.508999 2.277079 
3 2.204247338 0.0626 8.200867 1.580166 2.496925 
4 3.150453815 2.092171 5.943398 0.590629 0.348843 
5 2.150902867 0.0626 6.403549 1.711013 2.927564 
 
5. Alt_5__Dedicated_Router (Dedicated Combat routers) 
Each CTF node has a basic network topology as described in the current 
architecture description. However, there is an auxiliary network with a Cisco 4050 router 




Figure 32 - Alternative 5, Dedicated Routers 
 
Network topology modifications for this scenario included segregating all combat 
and non-combat traffic. A client Ethernet workstation, router and dedicated SATCOM 
connection were deployed to segregate the two traffic types. A detailed explanation of the 
network topology for this scenario can be found in Appendix G. Command and control 
data exchanges were created using an exponential distribution with an inter-arrival time 
of twelve seconds and a fixed transaction size of 32768 bytes. The output for the 
simulation runs is shown below in Table 21. The mean database query time for the five-
run set was 1.96 seconds.  
Table 21 - Alt. 5, Dedicated Router Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 2.834375 0.070528 9.721016 2.280378 5.200123 
2 1.477662 0.070528 8.252114 2.219676 4.92696 
3 2.013631 0.070528 6.486076 1.58506 2.512417 
4 1.560763 0.070528 10.1299 2.3267 5.413533 
5 1.92786 0.070528 6.20473 1.626158 2.64439 
 
6. Alt_6__Priority_Queued  
The purpose of this excursion is to examine priority queuing techniques under a 
stressed SATCOM link. The network topology for this scenario is the same as 
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Alt_4_DiffServ. However, in order to create a stressed SATCOM link, information 
exchange requirements were deployed on each of the SATCOM links in the mesh 
network.  A DSCP based QoS profile was used for command and control traffic. C2 
traffic packets were marked for expedited forwarding at router interfaces.  Command and 
control data exchanges were created using an exponential distribution with an interarrival 
time of twelve seconds and a fixed transaction size of 32768 bytes. The output for each of 
the simulation runs is shown below in Table 22. The mean database query time for the 
five-run set was 2.76 seconds.  
Table 22 - Alt. 6, Priority Queued Results 
 
Mean Min Max StdDev Variance 
1 2.559644138 0.070528 8.22809 1.994492 3.977997 
2 3.781552902 2.111873 9.523247 1.258133 1.582899 
3 1.758739734 0.070528 9.934209 2.387784 5.701513 
4 2.190668157 0.070528 4.892946 1.480061 2.190581 
5 3.531753607 0.070528 10.83491 2.674309 7.151928 
 
 
E. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
Figure 33 is a least-squares trend line used to summarize the database query 
response times.  The following observations are made for the comparisons of each model.   
1. Dedicate Routers 
The architectures modeled did not descriminate any option based on performance. 
From Figure 33, the shortest response time was alternative five, dedicated combat router 
scenario. Of the alterntives modeled, this alternative provided the best alternative to 
reduce command and control information delay. All of network technologies modeled 
provided suitable performance. 
2. Performance over Time 
The scenario used the model alternatives with purposely loaded communication 
and network resources in order to surface the performance characteristics. Since the 
project team strategy was not to attempt to create a model of real word terrestrial, 
satellite, or shipboard networks (due to data classification concerns with illustrating fleet 
capabilities and limitations) the reader may want to take care in drawing conclusions 
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concerning actual fleet network fleet performance. However, the model does predict that 
if the networks are loaded to capacity and the satellite communication capacity remains 
fixed, the C2 delays and overall quality will diminish with time (included current 
systems). Therefore the operational commander may need to balance the requirements for 
information with stability of C2 networks. 
3. Satellite Comminication Capacity.  
Unexpectedly, increasing satellite data capacity did not provide shorter database 
query response time (in the short term). It is possible that with more time overall 
performance may have stabilized to a favorable outcome. The safest conclusion to reach 
is that increasing satellite capacity can easily improve data throughput but may not in 
itself reduce delay time. Given a longer simulation runtime, Alt_2_Satellite_Capacity 




Figure 33 - DB Query Trend Lines 
 
 
F. CLEARING HOUSE 
The clearing house architecture is based on having a centralized data center to 
handle information exchange quickly and easily through direct data transfers. The JCCS 






































information theoretically through a single information request and data exchange. The 
central focus of the clearing house is to collect and disseminate data request as soon as 
data is available so as to ensure all participants have current synchronized information.  
 
Figure 34 - Clearing House Alternative 
 
The JCCS model is the adaption of the baseline architecture containing equivalent 
system hardware using similar systems and capabilities as identified within the baseline 
system.  Cisco 4050 routers were used within the CTFs and Cisco 7000 routers for the 
JFMCC.  Satellite bandwidth was kept at 1544 Kbps. Simulation runs were executed 15 
minutes with identical seed values.   
A simulation run is composed of a model running for 5 runs each with a period of 
15mins using a predefined set of seed values for each run. The same seed list is used for 
each modeling change as specified by the Discrete Event Simulation (DES) list.  The 
seed essentially provides randomness for generating data flow injected into the network 
so as to reflect real-time use. For example, a seed value of 0 would provide a constant 
injection rate of data into the network. The time of 15mins was chosen since longer times 
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generated a tremendous amount of data points which stabilized just shortly before the 
15min time interval. As for the types of data that was collected, Appendix G indicates 
which data items were selected for collection in OPNET. Figure 35 illustrates the trend 
lines generated from the simulation for each DES value. 
 
 
Figure 35 – Clearing House Database Query Trend Lines 
 
 





























To ensure that readers properly understand limitations of the clearing house 
model, assumptions and limitations are listed below.   
a. Actual shipboard network architecture was not modeled.  Instead, an 
abstraction of typical shipboard network architecture was implemented for 
modeling simplicity and consistency across excursions.   
b. Processing and behavior of the C2 systems were not characterized.  
Representative data flows were used rather than actual data flows.  If 
representative data flows were used, model classification would not 
remain unclassified.   
c. A notional operational construct was assumed.  A specific communication 
plan or Operational Plan was not selected.  The chosen operational 
construct was used for simplicity of modeling.   
d. Available presets were used from the OPNET model for application 
demands. C2 traffic was modeled as an application demand using a “high” 
traffic demand.  
e. Simulation period was fixed at 15 minutes in order to capture a 
statistically significant number of model runs.   
f. Disconnected/ intermittent communications were not modeled.  All 
excursions assumed fully connected communication between operational 
nodes.   
g. Multiple satellite communications paths were not modeled. All excursions 
assumed a single Super High Frequency satellite communications link 
between operational nodes.  
h. Not all possible Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) were 
modeled such as Plain Old Telephone System and Voice Over IP. 
i. For the experiment, email passing through the TCP layer was chosen to be 
a representative choice for simulation message exchanges from one 
command to another. Transfer times of the packet from point to point is 
collected indicating the current performance of the network. 
Understandably, there are many factors to consider, but simplicity and 
seeing fundamental differences became a desirable direction. 
 79 
1. Basic Clearing House Analysis 
The trend line from each seed shows they converge at a 3 second response time that is 
slightly higher than the other alternatives. A statistical summary is provided in Table 23.  
Overall, evaluating the means indicate that there was no significant performance 
difference than the other scenarios.  
Table 23 – Clearing House  
N$&1! N)1! N&O! ID.+$#! P&%)&1J$!
9Q7<;;>;8?=! 6Q6=6;8>! >Q88>6?! 7Q??::?8! 9Q?==??=!
8Q897<76>68! 8Q777>=9! ?Q;898:=! 7Q8;>799! 7Q;>8>??!
8Q7:>6:<;7?! 6Q6=6;8>! ?Q?9:86?! 8Q9>==>:! ;Q=67;79!
9Q;>67>6;6>! 6Q6=6;8>! :Q>?8?:<! 7Q:>66<7! 8Q7?6;>7!
8Q;=:7=9<=8! 6Q6=6;8>! 76Q>9:?7! 8Q<=:96?! =Q7;7?8>!
 
Evaluating the top three trend lines of the alternate scenarios including the 
baseline with the clearing house, shows their comparisons in Figure 36 using a DES-3 
result. The selection of DES-3 was arbitrary with comparisons using different seed values 
showing similar characteristics. 
 





























2. Clearing House Findings 
The following observations are made for the comparisons of each model.   
• With a clearing house approach, more traffic is expected to pass through a 
central point, which may attribute to a longer response time. 
• A single router, a Cisco 7505, at the clearing house is handling all traffic.  
Having a dedicated router for each satellite was shown to be effective. 
• Satellite capacity of 1544 Kpbs used for the traditional C2 architecture 
was also used for the clearing house model., Presumably additional 
satellite capacity  may improve the outcome 
Recommendations from the observations by the alternatives indicate that using 
dedicated routers to handle the extra traffic is necessary. A server cluster or server farm 
would provide the needed requirements to handle the expanded data flow. Router 




VII. DESCISION ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED 
The project team employed a quantitative decision matrix to establish priorities of 
several possible systems of system approaches for evaluated various alternatives based on 
modeling and simulation results to determine a score of benefit to fleet battle 
management based on the weighted value system developed in the Research Phase.   
Figure 31 illustrates this process 
 
Figure 37 - Summary of Decision Analysis Process 
 
B. METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED 
 
Modeling and Simulation was employed by the project team to help predict 
performance system of systems alternatives. In many cases the determination of the 
performance required extrapolation of the modeling and simulation results since not 
every permutation possibility was modeled. In addition the models purposely did not try 
to simulate real world performance to avoid any issues with data classification of the 
results and findings. 
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The project team employed a comparative analysis technique in order to overcome 
the problem of not being able to score alternatives based on actual expected performance.  
Initial step was model the as-is network and communication systems to determine the 
baseline performance. Significant excursions from the baseline (router improvements 
satellite communications improvements, etc) were modeled to determine the relative 
effect. The project team made several assumptions to permit interpolation of the 
modeling results to form this ranking. 
• Satellite communication upgrades were additive to the overall performance of 
and networking and router upgrades. 
• Multi-Protocol Label Switch (MPLS) technology was not explicitly modeled.  
It was assumed (for command and control traffic) that MPLS will perform 
similarly as a dedicated system of routers  
• Details of routing systems in the DISN cloud were not considered in the 
modeling nor the scores 
• JCSS had readymade modeling tools for CISCO System hardware, however 
the project team assumed that similar performance would be obtained using 
other vender products. 
Overall this allowed the team to develop a ranking evaluation for the various 
alternatives against the user’s value system. These rankings were used as input into the 
decision matrix that is discussed in the next section. 
 
C. DECISION MATRIX 
Based on these models, each alternative was ranked as to its ability to satisfy the key 
measure in the user’s value system. The raw score illustrated in the decision matrix in 
Figure 32 is the summation of the ranking multiplied by the weights. For the scoring in 
this matrix, the higher performing alternatives received a higher rank. For example: 
Dedicated routes with standard SATCOM was determined to be the best performing 
option so it is ranked  highest with a score of 14.   
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I&">?-7J KLMN KLMN KLNO KLNO KLMN
Baseline  (current systems) Baseline (current systems) NK NK NK NK NK NKLN
Baseline (current network 
systems) Upgrades O O O O O OLKO
Implement DIFFSERVE Standard P P P P P PLKP
Implement DIFFSERVE Upgraded Q Q Q Q Q QLKQ
Implement MPLS Standard R R R R R RLKR
Implement MPLS Upgraded S S S S S SLKS
Upgrade Routers Standard T T T T T TLKT
Upgrade Routers Upgraded U U U U U ULKU
Dedicated C2 Routers Standard NR NR NR NR NR NRLNR
Dedicated C2 Routers Upgraded NS NS NS NS NS NSLNS
Upgraded Routers w/MPLS Standard NM NM NM NM NM NMLNM
Upgraded Routers w/MPLS Upgraded NN NN NN NN NN NNLNN
Clearing House Standard M M M M M MLKM
Clearing House Upgraded N N N N N NLKN
Total Ranking Points NKPLN
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For this particular case each alternative was either measured or predicted to 
perform similar with respect to each of the five measures identified in the value system. 
Therefore the value system weights did not help discriminate between alternatives.  
 
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Based on the Normalized score derived from the decision matrix, Table 24 
provides the Benefit Scoring of each alternative (higher is better). These results will be 
used to score cost versus benefit later in this report. 
Table 24 - Benefit Scoring of Alternatives 
ALTERNATIVE Benefit (Normalized) 
NETWORK SATCOM  
Baseline  (current systems) Baseline (current systems) 0.10 
Baseline (current network systems) Upgraded 0.09 
Implement DiffServ Standard 0.06 
Implement DiffServ Upgraded 0.05 
Implement MPLS Standard 0.04 
Implement MPLS Upgraded 0.03 
Upgrade Routers  Standard 0.08 
Upgrade Routers Upgraded 0.07 
Dedicated C2 Routers Standard 0.13 
Dedicated C2 Routers Upgraded 0.12 
Upgraded Routers w/MPLS Standard 0.11 
Upgraded Routers w/MPLS Upgraded 0.10 
Clearing House  Standard 0.02 
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VIII. LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYIS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Life cycle cost estimation (LCCE) for this capstone project was based on 
representative Navy command and control, network, and satellite communications 
systems. Sixty-nine exhibits from these program’s cost data were studied to create a Cost 
Breakdown Structure (CBS). The CBS was created following the process guidance from 
“Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures”, DoD 5000.4-M.(Department of Defense 
1992) In addition, the data was used to create a summary cost table for life cycle cost per 
year for ten years.  This summary cost estimate is also used to estimate a cost for the 
proposed solution.  It then was used to analyze the cost versus expected benefits. 
The life cycle phases of the system were Research & Development (R&D), 
Production & Installation (P&I), and Operations & Support (O&S). No calculations for a 
Retirement & Disposal phase were included as it was assumed that Tech Refresh cycles 
continually remove the antiquated hardware. Figure 33 shows the life cycle phases with 
estimated years for each phase. 
 
      
    R & D 
   
  P & I 
 
                                          O & S 
  1              2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9 
      Years 
 
Figure 39 - Program Life Cycle Phases 
 
The cost breakdown structure shown in Figure 40 was developed based on sample 
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Figure 40 - Cost Breakdown Structure 
 
Research and development cost elements include the following activities: 
program management, acquisition management, financial management, logistics 
management, and contract management. It also includes engineering research and 
development to design hardware and software of the system, perform systems 
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engineering tasks such as configuration management, logistics engineering, Automated 
Data Processing (ADP) and Technical Direction Authority (TDA) support.  The last 
major portion of this cost category is engineering test and evaluation.   
Production and Installation cost elements include hardware and software 
procurement and installation, and spare parts. It also includes funding for Integrated 
Logistic Support (ILS) teams who perform test and installation and provide system initial 
operation training and equipment familiarity training. This cost element also includes 
technical documentation providing engineering data, management data, logistics support 
data, and data repositories. 
Finally, the Operation and support cost includes the cost of mission personnel, 
operator training, and operational facilities. In addition, it also includes the cost of 
maintenance personnel, maintenance training, outfitting and spare parts, software 
maintenance, help desk tasks and warranty management. Sustaining logistics support was 
estimated based on an estimation of percentage of equipment going end of life (EOL) 
during the operations phase and the test and installation support needed to replace the 
EOL equipment. 
As articulated earlier, there was no cost estimated for disposal phase.  However, 
this cost is estimated under external activities to SPAWAR functions. This phase would 
include system phase out and disposal cost and remediation costs. 
 
B. COST ANALYSIS 
The costs of the alternative solutions were estimated in order to evaluate the total 
Life Cycle costs for each alternative. A summary of these costs is provided in Table 25.   
Appendix C provides detailed Life Cycle Cost Estimates for each alternative.  The key 
assumptions that the project team used in this analysis are: 
• The baseline cost of RDT&E and OPN were derived from historical data in 
order to calculate future years’ cost, however the historical costs are 
accounted as sunk cost and thus not included in this life cycle cost analysis. 
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• The cost of alternatives cost is spread to multiple years due to assumption by 
the project team that the upgrade will take more than one year to implement 
(which is typical based on deployment schedules and ship availability). 
• A hardware refresh was assumed to happen during the fifth year of life cycle. 
• The costs of alternatives utilizing current SATCOM capacity are close to the 
baseline cost except for the priority queuing alternative.   
• The priority queuing alternative cost noticeably lower than the other 
alternatives by about half the cost.  This is due to the reduction in number of 
watch-standers from 4 to 2 personnel required to monitor the system.   
• The Operations and Maintenance (O&M) cost for all other alternatives remain 
same as the baseline as the personal and manning are assumed to be same in 
those cases. 
• The cost of hardware are based on commercial cost per unit and the 
implementation efforts are based on info gathered from team members who 
are subject matter experts 
 
Table 25 – Summary of Cost for Alternatives 






Baseline 8,991,091 135,355,734 
Upgraded Routers 9,051,786 138,495,183 
Implement DiffServ in 
Routers 
8,996,889 135,361,545 
Implement Multi Protocol 
Label Switching 
9,018,527 135,374,445 
Dedicated Routers 9,074,013 135,362,348 
Upgraded Routers + MPLS 9,122,325 138,510,973 
Priority Queues 5,176,798  131,594,040 
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Figures 41 and 42 show the costs of alternatives utilizing both current and 
































































C. COST VERSUS BENEFIT 
For each of the alternatives, the project team considered the cost vs. benefit in 
order to determine if there was any trends or findings that could be use to form 
recommendations for investment strategies. A graph of this is provided in Figure 43.   
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This graph shows that that there are several low cost options, with relatively little 
benefit.  At the other extreme, there is a cluster of options that provide more benefit with 
great cost. The only option that appears to offer reasonable benefit for the cost is the 
option labeled: Dedicated Router, which employs a dedicated set of routers for C2 traffic 
with the existing SATCOM capability. 
 
 
D. COST ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
The LCCE for the alternatives provides good insight to the project team for the 
completion of the trade-off study. 
1. Routers and Network Upgrades 
The alternatives using router upgrade cost more than the ones with software or 
configuration upgrades. This is due to the higher cost of routers and installation materials.  
Operations and Support costs remain basically the same for each alternative, which 
logically keeps the LCCE comparable across these alternatives  
 
2. Increased Satellite Bandwidth Alternatives 
Alternatives employing increased satellite communication bandwidth incur 
increased system costs, averaging $127,231,834K per alternative over a ten-year system 
support. The cost of SATCOM upgrade is based on historical RDT&E and OPN cost of 
implantation of 4 SATCOM terminals. The cost of SATCOM upgrade is estimated to be 
$131,048,789K in today’s dollar value, based on a conservative 3% average yearly 
escalation. This maybe an unfair comparison as its reasonable to expect that no single 
network appliance will remain in fleet use for more than 10 years, but SATCOM costs 
can be amortized over longer timeframes. It should be noted that for ease comparison 
between the various options, the project team kept to a ten-year life cycles for each option  
 
3. Clearing House May Avoid Costs 
The most challenging alternative to provide cost estimates for the clearing house 
as the project team was not able to have a detailed design of an actual clearing house 
installation. However, the large advantage of the clearing house approach is the ability to 
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reduce manning requirements for COP data base managers. Because the reductions were 
significant, the Clearing House alternative offers significant cost savings over the same 
ten-year period.  
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IX. RISK ASSESSMENT 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Risk is the potential loss occurring when executing one or a series of events. It is 
measured as the combined effect of the probability of occurrence and the assessed 
consequence given that occurrence (Blanchard, p 344). The majority of the risk analysis 
performed is based on the potential of not meeting a specified benchmark. This 
investigation categorizes risk against those benchmarks whether they are technical and or 
programmatic in nature. However, benchmarks are directly linked to the of all system 
risk as not being able support adequate C2 to preclude loss of life and or property of the 
blue force while obtaining the C2 goals and objectives.  In order to quantify the potential 
loss or impact it is often necessary to define the both the likelihood and consequence of a 
risk event occurring. The risk analysis methodology adopted and described in this section 
provides the project management team and stakeholders insight to the risks associated 
with each alternative under review. 
To evaluate and compare risks of the alternative solutions a quantitative risk 
assessment process adapted from Systems Engineering Management was utilized by the 
project team. (Blanchard 2008). Each alternative was assessed for cost, schedule, and 
performance impact. 
Traditionally risk analysis in engineering has been to ensure the design is capable 
to conservatively avoid risk. This risk focus is usually defined as some performance 
failure metric and risk is mitigated by applying an engineering safety factor. However as 
systems become more complex and engineering becoming increasingly integrated into 
the overarching development process, risk analysis is required to support additional 
activities involving cost, schedule and even policy decision making. To fully analyze the 
findings detailed within this effort, two types of risk assessments are utilize in supporting 
a decision matrix. Qualitative and quantitative risks are both utilized to adequately 
address the alternative under review. Thus the analysis will characterize the engineering, 
complexity, performance, cost, and schedule risk associated with each of the alternatives 
according to the risk methodology. This methodology adopted is illustrated in Figure 33, 
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Simplified Risk Analysis Methodology Flow Chart.  To facilitate the risk management 
process, potential risks are identified and characterized in order to determine probability 
of a failure (Pf) occurring and the consequence of that failure (Cf). Mathematically, this 
model can be expressed as:  
Risk factor (RF) = Pf + Cf – (Pf)(Cf) 
As shown, the overall risk factor is determined from the union of the two sets, 
noting that RF is largest when both Pf and Cf are large and may be high if either is large.  
To provide greater fidelity, Pf  and Cf can be defined by sub risks and weighted to reflect 
the realities of the solution environment. Table 26, Risk Sub Factor Assignment and 
Weighting Rubric, provides the weighting assigned to specific sub risk parameters and 
updated mathematical risk formula. Tables 27, Probability of Failure (Pf) Rubric and 28, 
Consequences of Failure (Cf) Rubric, contain the sub risk factors rubric utilized to 
determine the numeric values of risk analysis.  Using the rubric guides, each sub risk 
factor is evaluated and assigned a value according to the most appropriate condition 
reflected in its respective rubric. After all sub risk factors are determined, the overall risk 
factor can be determined for each potential solution. The overarching risk factor is 
considered the union of sets which contain the probability of failure and the consequence 
of failure. The probability of failure is derived from the following attributes; maturity 
factor (Pm), complexity factor (Pc) and dependency factor (Pd).  The maturity and 
complexity factors are comprised of subunits that characterize the hardware and software 
implementation separately. The consequences of failure are assessed on the impact on the 
following attributes; technical performance (Ct), cost (Cc) and schedule (Cs). 
In order to properly meet the objectives of this potential C2 technology 
enhancement, specific attributes are weighted more than others being considered.  In our 
case, the risk of personnel and property being lost is most dependent on the technical 
performance and therefore it is weighted more than cost and schedule. Likewise hardware 
and software failures may not have the same impact depending on the maturity or the 
complexity of the configuration. All weighing assignments as assessed and assigned are 
listed in Table 26, Risk Sub Factor Assignment and Weighting Rubric. 
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RISK ANALYSIS
IDENTIFY POTENTIAL RISK ITEMS
IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS/FACTORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE RISK ITEM
DETERMINE PROBABILITY OF FAILURE (Pf)
Pf = (a)(Pmhw) + (b)(Pmsw) + (c)(Pchw) + (d)(Pcsw) + (e)(Pd)
DETERMINE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE (Cf)
Cf = (f)(Ct) + (g)(Cc) + (h)(Cs) 
COMPUTE RISK FACTOR (RF)







HIGH RISK MEDIUM RISK LOW RISK
1 RISK REPORT
2 RISK ABATEMENT PLAN
3 RISK MANAGEMENT BOARD REVIEW
4 FOLLOW AS ACTION ITEM
1 REGULAR REVIEW TO ASSURED
   CONTINUED LOW STATUS








Table 26 - Risk Sub Factor Assignment and Weighting Rubric 
RISK FACTOR (RF) = Pf + Cf – Pf Cf 
Pf  = (.1*Pmhw) + (.1*Pmsw) + (.2*Pchw) + (.3*Pcsw) + (.3*Pd) 
Cf = (.5*Ct) + (.3*Cc) + (.2*Cs) 
Nomenclature  Risk Sub Factor 
Description 











Software closely related to routing 








Hardware, although mature, may 
exhibit unknown behavior in 








Software is considered mature for 
the technologies evaluated, 
however complex systems various 
software often exhibit less than 
optimum performance as a result of 
poor configuration optimization  
Pd 
Dependency 




Infrastructure cannot be replaced in 
whole, therefore all solutions are 








Future performance increase is 




cost over runs .3 
Cost is significant, however if 
performance increase is significant 
with marginal cost increase, 
additional funds may be obtained 
Cs 
Consequence of 
schedule slippage .2 
Schedule provides the most trade 
space as existing systems are 
providing a level of acceptable 
performance near term if 
implementation delay is short 
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Table 27 - Probability of Failure (Pf) Rubric 
Probability of Failure (Pf) 
Magnitude 
Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc) Dependency 







































































































Table 28 - Consequences of Failure (Cf) Rubric 
Consequences of Failure (Cf) 
Magnitude Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc) Schedule Factor (Cs) 
o.1 Low 





some transfer of 
money 
Negligible impact on 
program, slight development 
schedule change 
compensated by available 
schedule slack 
0.3 Minor 





by 1 to 5 percent 
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required 
0.5 Moderate 




increased by 5 to 
20 percent 







increased by 20 
to 50 percent 
Significant development 
schedule slip 
0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved 
Cost estimates 
increased in 
excess of 50 
percent 
Large schedule slip that 
affects segment milestones 
or has possible effect on 
system milestones 
 
Using the methodology described, a risk factor for each of the alternative under 
consideration was developed. Each alternative was evaluated without modifying the 
SATCOM radio frequency transport and an enhanced version of the SATCOM radio 
frequency transport. A summary of the derived risk factors are provided in Table 29, Risk 
Factor Comparison of Alternatives. The individual sub risk assignments and tabular data 
for each solution are provided as Appendix B for reference. 
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Table 29 - Risk Factor Comparison of Alternatives 
Alternative 







Alternative 0 - Baseline 0.28 Low 0.72 High 
Alternative 1 - DiffServ 0.54 Medium 0.86 High 
Alternative 2 - MPLS 0.54 Medium 0.86 High 
Alternative 3 - Router Upgrade 0.68 Medium 0.89 High 
Alternative 4 - Dedicated C2 Routers 0.86 High 0.94 High 
Alternative 5 - Upgraded routers 
w/MLPS 0.70 Medium 0.81 High 
Alternative 6 - Clearing House 0.63 Medium 0.85 High 
Risk Factor Assignment Legend 
0.7 < RF < 1.0 High Risk 
0.3 < RF < 0.7 Medium Risk 
0.0 < RF < 0.3 Low Risk 
 
B. RISK SUMMARY 
The risk assessment provides a documented methodology and results that are 
obtained systematically, complete, unbiased and transparent.  In executing this 
methodology, constraints, uncertainties and assumptions are considered at each step in 
the assessment process and documented. The output of this risk assessment is to present 
risk management options with an evaluation of each alternative that supports the decision 
making process of the project management. 
The baseline risk factor is one of the six alternatives, but is provided for 
information only. The risk factor baseline of 0.28 is a low risk and represents the “as-is” 
system that may meet C2 requirements in the short term.  However in the long term one 
could propose this option is higher and boarders on high risk if C2 requirements of the 
future dramatically increase and this option chosen. Under the latter assumption, the 
baseline choice is essentially not an option from the risk perspective. 
Although the alternatives under investigation focus on data transport through 
predominately “wired” networks, each alternative is also paired to a pseudo seventh 
alternative of increasing data transport across radio frequencies in the super high 
frequency band utilizing satellite communication methodologies. The alternative is 
considered pseudo as it is a non option because of the magnitude of the cost and schedule 
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increase above the assumptions of this assessment.  Thus the information is included as 
an informational investigation as to the risk associated when combining two distinct 
solutions that are normally segmented. 
As shown previously, alternatives one and two have the lowest risk factor among 
the group. This is reasonable as the application of the software routing protocols into the 
existing system is similar and the minimal hardware upgrades do not drive up the risk of 
one choice over the other.  Key to managing either of these efforts is the major software 
changes, dependency of the performance on existing systems and the potential for 
significant development schedule slip. Next, alternative six, clearing house, provides 
reduced development cost compared to the other alternatives, however software 
complexity is a high risk forcing function that may impact and render the cost benefits 
null if not managed vigorously by the project management team with an appropriate 
abatement plan. Increasing in risk, alternatives three and five, router upgrade and router 
upgrade with MLPS, are at the upper scale of the medium risk primarily as a result of 
performance being highly dependent on the installation of completely new hardware. 
Likewise, with alternative six, will require an appropriate abatement plan be developed 
and executed to prevent performance degradation during implementation.   
Alternative four and the SATCOM bandwidth increase coupled with any option is 
clearly high in risk.  Restraint and caution should be exercised prior to proceeding with 
any of these options. If performance dictates one of these options as the only viable 
solution, another detailed risk analysis must be performed. The new analysis 
methodology should be tailored to the specifics of that type of complex undertaking.  
New attributes and weighting should be introduced into the present method to further 
characterize the risk associated with SATCOM, cost control and the complexity of 





X. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The project team employed a MBSE approach to document the requirements, 
define the operational architecture, define high level functions that the networks must 
support, and model different system of system alternatives. Naval Warfare Publications, 
Navy Tactics, Technique and Procedure Publications and leadership writing were 
analyzed to refine a set of coincide technical performance measure that navy networks 
need to satisfy to support Fleet Battle Management. These key measures are:  
a. Delay time for propagation of vital situational awareness information 
throughout the network 
b. Percentage of time soft-real-time requirements that can be maintained 
throughout the network 
c. Percentage of time hard-real-time requirements that can be maintained 
throughout the network 
Fleet stakeholders were engaged throughout the process to develop a value system based 
on these concise measures that was used to analyze these alternatives.  
The project team researched how other industries might address the issue of 
meeting the key measures. It was discovered that the Global banking System employs 
architectures and technology in order to address many of the same requirements. A 
concept of a transaction clearing house was identified as an alternative way to build 
trusted transactions between operational nodes enhancing Command and control and 
improving fleet battle management 
The project developed a representation of the operational functional architecture 
using the Vitech CORE system engineering toolset. A huge advantage to this approach is 
the ability to model the effect of operational activities and organization with respect to 
meeting the key measures. A significant finding was that the organizational construct had 
significant impact on how well Fleet Battle Management can be supported.   
The Joint Communication Simulation System (JCSS) toolset was utilized to 
develop a physically representative model to understand how different networking 
architectures could be employed. Since there are copious alternatives to model, a Design 
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of Experiments approach was adopted to obtain data on several significant permutations 
with data extrapolation used to score effectiveness of some solutions. 
The project team performed a cost analysis and assessment of risk, both from 
aspect of vulnerability to operational threats and cost/schedule/performance 
considerations to all alternatives. A summary of the alternatives along with scores for 
benefit, risk, and estimates of Life Cycle Cost is provided in Table 30. 
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Based on the analysis and methodology presented for this project, the project 
team makes the following recommendation for naval investment strategy in Fleet battle 
Management. 
1. Dedicated C2 Routers 
The project team recommends in augmenting current ashore and afloat networks 
with dedicated routers (having standard performance capability as currently fielded 
router) dedicated to carrying C2 traffic.  While Navy networks have aided in the ability 
for Navy operational and tactical forces to rapidly share information, the concern the 
project team has with the current operational and tactical seam is that critical command 
and control data can be significantly delayed with general traffic when networks and 
communications channels become saturated. While  adding satellite communications 
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capacity will aid data throughput, it in itself does not appear to address any of the key 
measure for effective fleet battle management. 
 
2. More Research into Clearing House Architectures 
The functional; and physical models for the data clearing house approach did not 
show remarkably better improvement for fleet battle management over existing networks. 
However this approach was the one alternative that offers US Navy significant cost 
avoidance by reducing Operations and Support costs.  The project team recommends that 
this approach for C2 warrants further study to see how information exchanges and 
organizational tuning can better utilize the clearing house approach. 
 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1. Data Pedigree 
Discussions with the Technical Director for PMW150 identified a need for 
establishing and maintaining data pedigree within the C2 information systems.  This is 
driven by the need to further enhance the commander’s trust in the information presented.  
The investigation of data pedigree would necessitate an excursion into the realm of Data 
Engineering and would thus be beyond the scope of this project.  Further investigation, 
however, would be warranted in this area to support the ability of the commanders across 
echelons to self-synchronize as operational and battle plans are executed. The hypothesis 
would be that speed of command would be enhanced by providing decision makers with 
information that included a level of metadata that would readily indicate the level of 
goodness, or proximity to reality of the current battlespace state. 
 
2. Detailed Operational Timelines 
As discussed in earlier paragraphs, the Functional Analysis did not delve into 
analysis of time and resources (people, bandwidth, etc.) of various Command and Control 
function to alleviate any concerns of data classification. The project team acknowledges 
that without such fidelity, the analysis will not discover where there maybe be 
bottlenecks or blocking conditions that can impede effective Command and Control.  
This would be a meaningful study objective. 
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3. Human Factors and Cognitive MOPs and MOEs 
While there is a recognition that the cognitive aspects of command and control 
and its associated decision making aspects cannot be ignored, treatment of these aspects 
in depth is beyond the scope of this project. Li Niu, et al assert that a framework can be 
applied to cognition driven decision support in the business domain using a conceptual 
framework (Niu, Lu, and Zhang 2009). This framework, shown in Figure 34 establishes a 
series of relationships that have situational awareness and mental models at the core of 
the decision making process.  This concept could be very useful in understanding the 
cognitive architecture capabilities and limitations, and thus provide for the development 




Figure 45 - Cognitive Driven Processes [From Niu, Lu, and Zhang 2009] 
 
4. Data Perishability & Clutter 
In the course of conducting research and investigating the various excursions of 
the technical architectures, the concept of data perishability was identified.  What is 
meant by data perishability is the association of data value degradation over time. The 
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hypothesis in this case would assert that certain types of data becomes less valuable to the 
commander and the decision process as time goes by. While the capstone project afforded 
some analysis in the prioritization of data across the communications infrastructure, 
further analysis into the impacts of data perishability in a dynamic command and control 
environment were not investigated. 
 
5. Covert Forces  
Predominantly discussions of networked forces it is usually assumed that the 
forces want to be networked and in communications and collaborating.  There is a 
segment of naval forces that purposely operate covertly and purposely choose to not 
communicate.  Many of the tenets of queued information exchanges with assured 
transactions that are performed in the banking industry (as one example) may apply very 
well to these forces. Integrating this category of forces into a network centric paradigm 
requires further analysis. 
 
6. Clearing House Approach  
The functional; and physical models for the data clearing house approach did not show 
remarkably better improvement for fleet battle management over existing networks. This 
is likely due to the fact that in order to take full advantage of this approach requires re-
thinking the management model that has been in place for centuries is required. Research 
into the adoption of management models that take full advantage of the services and data 
strategies that can be effectively employed with a clearinghouse is recommended.   
 
D. Concluding Remarks 
The project team embarked on a investigation to determine how to improve fleet 
battle management using alternative networks designs and architectures While some 
improvement to FBM is likely with investment in technology, a surprise finding was that 
a significant limitation to fleet battle management may lie in the way Navy command and 
control structure are organized.  A key limitation may lie in the seam between operational 
and tactical level of command.  
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We began this exploration on the seminal writings of VADM Willard whose 
schooling on the “Art of Command and Control” seemed very fitting to this project. Our 
findings seem to echo VADM words in his 2002 article in Proceedings: 
“We must rediscover the lost art of command and control. Our training 
and developmental emphasis in the Navy and joint forces needs to 
embrace command and control as a fundamental operational task, with 
priority on schooling our commanders in what they must know, where to 
access that information, and how to act on it once they have it to guide the 
operation more effectively. We must better understand what the common 
picture is, what it is not, how to make it available to all levels of the 
command-and-control hierarchy, and how to use emerging technologies to 
exchange relevant, timely information and guidance. Finally, we must 
school commanders on the challenges of controlling more than one 
dynamic operation at once, how to recognize when their ability to guide 
effectively is being overcome, and what actions they might take to ensure 
that on-scene commanders continue to receive the assistance they need to 
advance their plans.”(Willard 2002) 
In our final closing remarks for this research, the following words penned in 1915 by 
LCDR Dudley Knox apply equally well to our times: 
“To reach the ultimate goal of war efficiency we must begin with principles, 
conceptions and major doctrines, before we can safely determine minor doctrines, 
methods and rules. We must build from the foundation upwards and not from the 
roof downwards. 
For example, it is important to determine whether our strategic and tactical 
operations shall be offensive or defensive in character, and whether they are to be 
introduced by “secondary warfare” (mines, destroyers and submarines) or by 
“primary warfare” (the employment of the whole force); whether the fleet will 
form in ordinary simple column or in an alignment of groups; whether a parallel 
fight is to be sought or a concentration of superior force at one or more points, 
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and if the latter how and where; whether each type of ship will be concentrated or 
the whole force divided into groups, each comprising several types; whether we 
will attempt to fight by exterior or interior lines; whether destroyers are to 
endeavor to cripple the enemy by a night attack preceding the general engagement 
or to be used only during the main fleet action; whether submarines shall adopt 
eccentric plans or be utilized jointly with the rest of the fleet; whether information 
is to be obtained by wide flung distant scouting or only by close scouting; whether 
our system of command is to provide the freedom of the initiative to subordinate 
commanders or will depend upon centralized direction by the commander-in-
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1.0 Project Introduction 
 This is the Project Management and Systems Engineering Plan (PM&SEP) for the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Cohort 311-092W, Capstone 
Project.  As part of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Master of Science in Systems 
Engineering (MSSE) Capstone Project, the Capstone Project team will examine the 
Measures of Performance (MOP), Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and Quality 
of Service͒ (QoS) Characteristic required to support an Agile and Network 
Centric Command and Control Organization. 
1.1 Project Description 
This Capstone Project topic was selected to support the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations (DCNO) for Information Dominance (N2/N6) roadmap effort.  Under this 
effort, the DCNO has identified a set 14 mission/capability roadmaps: 
! Undersea Dominance 
! Every sensor is networked 
! Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control 
! Maritime Domain Awareness 
! Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
! Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
! Cyber 
! Fleet Battle Management 
! Integrated Surface Sensors 
! Electromagnetic Spectrum 
! Air Dominance 
! Strike Command and Control 
! Decision Superiority 
! Spectrum Usage 
! Convergence to a Single network 
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The topic of this Capstone will address Fleet Battle Management.  The hypothesis 
that Fleet Battle Management (FBM) technologies, tactics, processes and procedures may 
benefit from the incorporation of some of the “game changing” transformational 
technologies articulated in the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Information Dominance 
vision has not been evaluated with systems engineering rigor.  Proper evaluation requires 
the definition of MOPs and TPMs associated with FBM success, the identification of 
gaps or shortfalls in current and programmed approaches, development of sufficiently 
detailed architectural alternatives, the construction of performance models, and the 
performance of high-level analyses and optimization of candidate solutions for both 
capability and Total Ownership Cost. 
1.2 Project Objective 
 This project will examine the MOP, MOE, and QoS characteristics required 
supporting an Agile and Network Centric Command and Control͒organization.  The 
spectrum of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) considerations will be examined. 
1.3 Project Team 
 The Project team is comprised of the following members dispersed on opposite 
shores of the United States: 
Fernando DeJesus SPAWAR System Center Pacific 56130; San Diego, CA 
Roger Gray   SPAWAR System Center Atlantic 58360; Charleston, SC  
Stewart Hall   SPAWAR Headquarters 5.0.5; San Diego, CA 
Benjamin McCoy SPAWAR System Center Pacific 55230; San Diego, CA 
Nazila Rashed  SPAWAR System Center Pacific 55130; San Diego, CA 
Steve Roa  SPAWAR System Center Pacific 53040; San Diego, CA 
Antonio Siordia SPAWAR System Center Pacific 84100; San Diego, CA 
Mike Shirley  SPAWAR System Center Atlantic 56150; Charleston, SC 
Adam Wolf  SPAWAR System Center Atlantic 55210; Charleston, SC 
Charles Wood  SPAWAR System Center Atlantic 56150; Charleston, SC 
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1.4 NPS Faculty Advisors 
1.4.1 Lead Advisor and Systems Engineering Advisor 
 The Lead Advisor for this Capstone Project is Dr. Donald S. Muehlbach Jr. 
Professor of Practice Department of Systems Engineering Graduate School of 
Engineering and Applied Sciences. 
1.4.2 Electrical and Computer Engineering Advisor 
 The Electrical and Computer Engineering Advisor for this Capstone Project is Dr. 
Weilian Su Associate Professor Advanced Networking Laboratory Department of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Naval Postgraduate School. 
1.5 PM & SEP Updates 
 This project management and Systems engineering plan is a living document and 
will be updated as needed throughout the Project duration. At a minimum this 
Management and Systems Engineering Plan will be updated during the first week of 
every academic quarter until the project is completed. This plan will be updated in the 
event of (but not limited to) the following occurrences: 
a. Change in team composition 
b. Changes in project scope or objective 
c. Change in stakeholder needs 
d. Changes to project incorporated after scheduled In Process Review 
Changes will be approved by NPS Faculty advisors then codified in this plan, and then be 
signed by the project team. Change rationale will be noted in the change history of this 
document. 
1.6 Applicable Documents and References 
Naval Post Graduate School. Capstone Project Guide DL SE Programs. Monterey: 
Department of Systems Engineering Naval Postgraduate School, 2006 
 
University of Chicago Press.  The Chicago Manual of Style. 15th ed. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2003 




International Council on Systems Engineering.  Systems Engineering Handbook: A Guide 
for System Life Cycle Processes and Activities, ver 3.1. 2007 
 
Steven H. Dam. DoD Architecture Framework: A Guide to Applying Systems 
Engineering to Develop Integrated, Executable Architecture. Marshall: System and 
Proposal Engineering Company, 2006. 
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition. 6th ed 
(ver 1.0). 2007 http://www.acq.osd.mil/sse/docs/2006RMGuide4Aug06finalversion.pdf 
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2.0 Project Management Plan 
2.1 Project Management Roles & Responsibilities 
 The Capstone Project team consists of ten team members who are located at San 
Diego, California and Charleston, South Carolina.  Members will share project 
management and systems engineering roles and responsibilities. Table 2-1 outlines the 
project management roles. 
 
Table 2-1 Project Management Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Role Primary Roles & Responsibilities  Key Responsibilities 
Team Captain Stewart Hall 
! Act as single POC for Team 
! Lead Planning 





! Act as Backup POC for Team 
! Assist Lead Planning 





! Maintain Project Schedules 
! Monitor Critical Path Activities 






! Risk identification 
! Risk Analysis 
! Risk monitoring 
! Risk Reporting 
Librarian 
Ben McCoy          
Roger Gray 
! Maintain Sakai website 
! Maintain data repository 
! Configuration control of all 
deliverables 
Project Management and Systems Engineering Plan  
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! Assembly of Deliverables  
! Administer quality control 
! Ensure technical merit and 
cohesiveness 
Charleston Team 
POC Roger Gray 
! Act as primary POC for Charleston 
team to help with coordination 
 
2.2 Project Cycle Overview 
 The project cycle for this Capstone Project is illustrated in Figure 2-1.  The 
project will be conducted in four phases: Initial Research, Architecture and Analysis, 
Forming Conclusions and Recommendations, and finally Reporting Results.  Each of the 
phases is described in the following subsections. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Project Cycle 
 
2.2.1 Phase 1: Initial Research 
 During this phase, the project team will begin to form and the research topic is 
selected. 
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Table 2-2 Phase One Key Events  
Entrance Criteria ! NPS approval of Project Management and System 
Engineering Plan 
! NPS approval of project topic 
! Stakeholder acceptance of topic 
Exit Criteria ! Peer Review of refined problem statement 
! Stakeholder acceptance of refined problem statement 
Key Activities ! Initial Project Management Plan 
! Initial Systems Engineering Plan 
! Selection of Project Topic 
! Stakeholder engagement 
! Team Assignments 
Decision Gates ! In Process Review One 
 
 
While research will continue during all phases of the project, the objective of Phase I is to 
perform the initial research that will reveal the true character of the research problem. 
 
2.2.2 Phase 2 Architecture and Analysis 
 During Phase 2, the project team will perform analysis and modeling of the 
problem. Current thinking, problem decomposition, and performance modeling will be 
employed to understand and characterize the problem space.  It is permissible if there is 
overlap between this phase and research phase.  However, the Project team must ensure 
that the research phase does not extend itself and risk timely initiation of the architecture 
and analysis phase.  Table 2-3 breaks down the events for this phase. 
  




Table 2-3 Phase Two Key Events  
Entrance Criteria ! Research has characterized the problem 
           “what about the current situation is unsuitable” 
! Potential approaches have been identified to permit 
modeling and analysis 
Exit Criteria ! Peer Review of refined problem statement 
! Stakeholder acceptance of refined problem statement 
Key Activities ! Updated Project Management Plan 
! Updated Systems Engineering Plan 
! Operational Architectures 
! System Architectures 
! Value System Development 
Decision Gates ! In Process Review Two 
! Stakeholder acceptance of value system 
 
 
2.2.3 Phase 3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 During Phase 3, the Capstone Project team will synthesize the problem analysis 
and recommend solutions and possibilities for continued research.  Table 2-6 illustrates 
the resulting actions required to complete a phase. 
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Table 2-4  Phase Three Key Events  
Entrance Criteria ! Architecture is complete 
! Value System is complete 
! Data obtained from models 
Exit Criteria ! Project Report 
Key Activities ! Data analysis  
! Life cycle cost estimates 
! Generation of project report 
Decision Gate ! Peer review of draft report 
! Stakeholder acceptance of draft results 
 
2.2.4 Phase 4 Reporting Results 
 During Phase 4, the Capstone Project team will report the results to NPS Staff and 
project stakeholders.  Table 2-5 describes the resulting actions to complete a phase. 
 
Table 2-5 Phase Four Key Events  
Entrance Criteria ! Capstone Report is complete 
Exit Criteria ! End of Academic Quarter 
Key Activities ! Project Brief 
! Report to stakeholders 
! Report to NPS staff 
Decision Gate ! Report peer review 
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2.3 Project Milestones & Deliverables 
 Key deadlines and proposed deliverables will be used to measure the progress of 
this project as well as provide recordable artifacts.  Table 2-6 lists the deliverables for this 
Capstone Project. 
Table 2-6 List of Deliverables  
 
Due Date Deliverable Description Key Products 
16 April 2010 Draft PM & SE plan 
! Project management process 
outline 
! System engineering process 
outline 
7 May 2010 PM & SE Plan (Version 1) 
! Problem Statement  
! Tailored system engineering 
process 
! Tailored management process 
21 May 2010 IPR # 1 
! Effective needs statement 
! User Requirements  
! Results of initial research 
! Risk Assessment 
21 July 2010 PM & SE Plan (Version 2) 
! Revised problem statement  
! Revised management process 
! Revised systems engineering 
process 
10 Sep 2010 IPR # 2 
! Updates from IPR #1 
! Architectures 
! Functional Modeling 
! Initial Alternatives 
identification 
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Due Date Deliverable Description Key Products 
12 Oct 2010 PM & SE Plan (Version 3) 
! Revised problem statement  
! Revised management process 
! Revised systems engineering 
process 
10 Dec 2010 IPR # 3 
! Updates from IPR #2 
! Summary of engineering 
products (Architectures, 
Functional Modeling, User 
requirements, Analysis of 
Alternatives, etc) 
! Recommendations 
09 Dec 2010 Final Project Report ! Final Project Report 
 
2.4 Stakeholder Engagement 
 Stakeholder engagement is a principal component of identifying the problem 
statement.  With their direction, vision, and advice, preliminary requirements can be 
created and help establish a base point to begin a project.  Table 2-7 summarizes the 
stakeholders that are expected to be involved during this Capstone Project.  Also 
indicated are expected interactions and indication of how familiar the team is with the 
stakeholder. 
  




Table 2-7 Stakeholder Summary  
 
Stakeholder Organization Anticipated Involvement Familiarity 
Dr Bill Rix SPAWAR 5.1 ! MOP & MOE 
Refinement 
! Architecture 
! Modeling Requirements 
Consultation 






Advisor & C2 
Technical 
Warrant 
! MOP & MOE 
Refinement 
! Architecture 
! Requirements Value 
System 
Medium 
Dr Rich Jaffee C2 
Competency 
National Lead 
! MOP & MOE 
Refinement 
! Architecture 












! MOP & MOE 
Refinement 
! Architecture 
! Lifecycle Cost 
Estimation 
Medium 
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! MOP & MOE 
Refinement 
! Architecture 




During the course of this Capstone Project, additional stakeholders may be identified and 
incorporated into a revision of this PMP. 
2.5 Project Risk Management 
 In conjunction with the fundamental objectives of the project being defined, 
fundamentals of risk planning will be executed.  It is anticipated that planning will follow 
the guidance of the DoD Risk Management Guide and INCOSE version 3.1 to employ a 
tailored risk management process throughout all phases of the project.  The basic process 
is composed of five phases: Identification, Analysis, Mitigation, Implementation, and 
Tracking as outlined in Figure 2-2.  Each phase will be described in more detail 
accordingly.  The development of a risk management plan is currently being evaluated.  
The risk management plan, if implemented, will contain details of the process, provide 
instruction for proper tracking and define roles and responsibilities of project participants 
with respect to risk.  All team members are charged with identifying potential risks and 
bringing them to the attention of the group.  Once issues are brought forth, it will be the 
responsibility of the risk control board to separate risks from issues; validate those risks 
and apply project resources accordingly.  The following paragraphs provide a high level 
description of each phase in the risk management cycle. 





Figure 2-2 Project Risk Management Process 
 
2.5.1 Risk Identification 
 Early risk identification is critical and vital for effective risk management.  It is 
the fiduciary duty of any project team member, faculty advisor, or stakeholder to identify 
and enter risks into the management process.  A risk may be defined as an uncertain 
event which may cause an execution failure in the program.  It is the possibility of loss, 
injury, disadvantage, or anything that has a negative impact on a program.  It is a measure 
of the inability to achieve program objectives.  Risk has two components: a probability of 
the event occurring and a consequence if the event occurs.  The criticality of these two 
components will be evaluated to determine the effects of risks on the program.  In 
reporting, whenever possible, risk statements should be expressed (or transformed) into if 
(situation) then (consequence) format.  Each member will have access to the risk 
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2.5.2 Project Risk Analysis 
 In order to assess the risks and apply resources appropriately, it is critical that the 
risk assessment contains both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the various risks 
occurring and their impact on costs, schedule adjustments, and effective performance.  
The risk management plan contains guidance for assessing the impact of each risk and 
applying measurements to prioritize the relative risk.  Details of the assessment model are 
provided in the risk management plan. 
2.5.3 Project Risk Mitigation 
 To minimize severity of identified risks, the Project team will develop mitigation 
plans for every identified and approved risk.  Risk mitigation or risk handling approaches 
will include the traditional options such as: control, avoid, assume, and transfer. The 
strategy for risk mitigation will vary depending upon the severity of risk, number of risks, 
and impact to stakeholders. In general as the project schedule cannot be relaxed, the most 
likely mitigation will be to refine the project scope.  In some instances stakeholders will 
need to be notified.  The key is proactive identification and risk management to ensure 
the project is successful completed and accepted by NPS and meets stakeholder 
expectations. 
2.5.4 Project Risk Implementation  
 The Project Risk manager and team will insure that the implementation process is 
a part of the day-to-day workings of the project.  To be successful, the team is adopting a 
continuous assessment process in which all members have access to risk information and 
current mitigation efforts.  Although risk management is engrained in our system 
engineering process, the risk manager will provide focused attention on active risks 
identified by the risk control board. 
2.5.5 Risk Monitoring and Reporting 
 Risks will be posted on the team shared information repository on Sakai.  Sakai is 
the NPS Collaborative Learning Environment, and is available to all members.  Initially, 
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risks will be documented in accordance with the risk management plan using the 
approved forms and processes.  The risks identified will be logged by the risk control 
board and entered into a log sheet that will provide high level metrics, status and 
references back to the risk initiation form.  In addition to the risk form and tracking log, 
major risks will be presented in a graphical format as illustrated in Figure 2-3.  The 
Project Risk Manager’s report will include the status of risks, risk mitigation and 
progress.  It will also be the risk manager’s responsibility to provide information and 
assistance as needed during team meetings and discussions. 
 The risk management team is currently evaluating the use of software tools such 
as Risk Radar, Risk++ and Risk Exchange to aid in executing the risk management 
process.  The cost, availability and applicability will be critical attributes in choosing the 
proper support tool.  Until support software is available, risks will be documented and 
tracked through traditional means such as approved risk forms, Excel tracking sheets and 
PowerPoint graphics. 
  
Figure 2-3 Risk Analysis Assessment Model 
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2.6 Project Schedule 
 The Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) Critical Path Method 
(CPM) will be employed to develop a project master schedule.  The master schedule will 
be created using an Office Project file.  The master schedule serves as a tool for 
evaluating project maintenance and reporting, as well as itemizes tasking needed for 
meeting each milestone date within each of the major cycle periods.  
 
2.6.1 Project Schedule Maintenance and Reporting 
 The Capstone Project Administrator will maintain the project schedule. The 
schedule will be kept updated on at least a weekly basis.  The project schedule will be 
formally reported during planned IPRs.  The Project Administrator will also report 
schedule changes as needed during team meetings and discussions. 
 
2.6.2 Project Master Schedule 
 Extracted from the detailed master project schedule, there are five major periods 
identified within the project cycle.  The first period identifies the Information and 
Gathering phase where preliminary ideas, data, and backgrounds are collected to 
formulate a problem statement and cumulating into a Project Management Plan.  Concept 
Development soon follows with a more detailed description of the scope and stakeholder 
needs.  Concept development outlines the boundary of the problem space.  After further 
research, functional analysis and architectural design are crafted within the engineering 
development period.  As a result, design recommendations and project summaries are 
evaluated and adjusted into a Conclusion and formally into a Final Report.  An outline of 
the schedule for this Capstone Project is provided in Figure 2-4.  




Figure 2-4 Project Schedule (05/09/2010) 
 
2.7 Deliverable Quality Control 
 The Project Editors will be responsible to ensure all deliverables meet the 
required format and content requirements.  All deliverables will be provided to the 
project editors prior to submission. 
 
2.8 Project Communications Plan 
 The Project team is divided between east coast and west coast members.  This 
creates challenges in work synchronization and communication. The following 
procedures are designed to minimize this challenge: 
a) Weekly Drumbeat Conference Calls to maintain communication  
b) Use of Online collaboration websites (DCO) 
c) Use of Sakai for primary document hosting 
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d) Use of VTC capability during class sessions 
e) Distributed team management 
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3.0 Systems Engineering Plan 
 
3.1 Systems Engineering Process Overview 
 The Project team will follow a tailored system engineering process based on the 
process described in: DoD Architecture Framework – A Guide to Applying Systems 
Engineering to Develop Integrated, Executable Architectures. The process will allow the 
project team to apply model base system engineering analysis to define the problem and 
present a solution during the time allotted.  Figure 3-1 illustrates this process. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Project Systems Engineering Process 
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3.1.1 SE Process tradeoff Variables 
 In order to determine what the correct SE process should be for the Capstone 
project, a set of measures of goodness need to be developed.  These will become the 
tradeoff variables to choose the proper SE process.  The tradeoff variables are listed 
below. 
 
! Risk Mitigation: The SE process implemented by the team must aid in risk 
mitigation throughout the Capstone project lifecycle.   This can be measured as 
the probability of defined project requirements being delivered under known 
timelines with a specific defined risk. 
 
! Quality Levels: The SE process must ensure that the products being created are 
meeting quality levels thereby limiting schedule growth.  This could be measured 
as a percentage of deviation from quality thresholds set by the internal and 
external stakeholders. 
 
! Lead Time:  Due to the strict nature of our schedule, we have to meet the final 
report submission deadline of early December.  The ideal SE process will limit 
the average amount of time from the defined inception point until the defined 
delivery point. 
 
3.1.2 Candidate Process Evaluation 
 The following processes were evaluated and weighted according to their 
advantages and disadvantages for this Capstone project: 
 
! Steven Dam’s process (modified) 
! Army SE process 
! Classic Vee model 
! Kossiakoff and Sweet 
! INCOSE  SIMILAR (modified) 
After final consideration, a modified version of Steven Dam’s process was selected as the 
recommended SE process to be used for this Capstone project.  The figure below 
describes the modified process. 




Figure 3-2 Project’s Modified Steven Dam’s Process 
 
The allocate function to systems element and prepare interface diagrams portion of the 
SE process, was deleted as this was a part of synthesis which the team will not be doing 
as part of the capstone project.  The Dam process clearly shows where the center of effort 
is by using horizontal time scale to depict the systems engineering lifecycle.  Another 
advantage of the Dam process is that it allows for parallel development of various 
analysis products which help optimize the lead time.  Quality levels are addressed with 
peer reviews of interim deliverables during the lifecycle.  While the process does not 
explicitly show risk mitigation in the diagram, this occurs in every phase of the process 
through risk identification, planning, and mitigation activities.  For further information on 
the risk process please consult the team’s risk planning guide. 
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3.2 Systems Engineering Roles & Responsibilities 
 Within the Capstone Project, six identified Functional roles have been identified 
and separately assigned to each team member with the exception of research work being 
done by all members.  Table 3-1 identifies these roles. 
Table 3-1 Project Management Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Role Primary Roles & Responsibilities  Key Responsibilities 
Research All 
! Define Operational Scenarios 
! Determine candidate systems 
! Assumptions & Constraints 





! Define functions 
! Functional allocation 






! Model functions 
! Performance & limitations 






! Logistics & Support Considerations 
! DOTMLPF Considerations 
! Make or Buy Analysis 





! Lifecycle Cost Estimation 
! CAIV Analysis 





! Act as single POC for Team 







! Defining Operational need 
! Architecture Synthesis 
Project Management and Systems Engineering Plan  
 
 29 
3.3 Model Based System Engineering Tools 
 This Capstone Project will use model-based systems engineering techniques for 
refinement, analysis, and traceability of requirements and architectures.  Table 3-2 
identifies some of the proposed tools that will be used. 
 
Table 3-2 Model-Based Systems Engineering Tools 
Manufacturer Name Application 
Vitech CORE 
! Architectures View Development 
! Requirements definition 
! Requirements traceability 
! Modeling & Simulation 
Microsoft Xcel ! Modeling and simulation 
Imagine That Inc ExtendSim ! Modeling and simulation 
 
3.4 Project Configuration Management Plan 
 All Capstone Project deliverables will be based on referenced documentation such 
as research artifacts, architecture views, modeling and simulation results, inter alia.  It is 
critical that these products be identified, archived, and properly referenced in all project 
output. The Capstone Project Configuration Manager will be responsible to devise (and 
enforce) a schema that will: 
a) Identify incremental versions of draft documentation 
b) Identify version of deliverables (briefs, reports, etc) 
c) Ensure that research artifacts are archived 
d) Ensure modeling data (data bases, inputs, analysis, analysis) are archived  
e) Historical artifacts and researched are protected and catalogued 
3.5 Project Data Management Plan 
 To ensure the integrity of the research and analysis, the Project team will ensure 
that all technical data required independently verifying conclusions, transition results to 
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stakeholders, or enabling future teams to continue this research all necessary data will be 
captured and delivered.  This will include (but is not limited to): 
a) Research Artifacts 
b) Architecture Views 
c) Any configuration data for tools  
d) Database inputs and Data output for models ** *






 APPENDIX B  RISK ANALYSIS EVLAUATION 
 
This attachment contains the individual alternative assessment tables and the risk factor 
calculations.  Each table is highlighted with the appropriate color indicating the 
assessment for each of the sub risk factor attributes. 
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 Table 1 – Alternative 0: Baseline - SATCOM Standard Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.28
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.1
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.20
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor Redesign Minor Redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major Change Feasible Major Change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology Available, Complex Design
New Software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the Art, some research complete
State of the Art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
 
Table 2 – Alternative 0: Baseline - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput  
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RF = Risk Factor 0.72
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.44
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.50
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor Redesign Minor Redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major Change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 3 – Alternative 1: Diffserv - SATCOM Standard Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.54
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.32
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.32
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technologyavailable, complexdesign
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 4 – Alternative 1: Diffserv - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.86
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.52
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.70
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
 
Appendix B  Risk Analysis Evaluation 
6 
 
Table 5 – Alternative 2: MPLS - SATCOM Standard Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.54
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.32
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.32
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 6 – Alternative 2: MPLS - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.86
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.52
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.70
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 7 – Alternative 3: Router Upgrade - SATCOM Standard Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.68
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.52
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.34
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 8 – Alternative 3: Router Upgrade - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.89
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.62
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.70
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 9 – Alternative 4: Dedicated C2 Routers - SATCOM Standard Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.86
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.7
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.52
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 10 – Alternative 4: Dedicated C2 Routers - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.94
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.7
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.80
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 11 – Alternative 5: Router Upgrade with MLPS - SATCOM Standard Throughput  
RF = Risk Factor 0.70
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.52
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.38
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 12 – Alternative 12: Router Upgrade with MLPS - SATCOM Enhanced 
Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.81
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.35
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.70
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 13 – Alternative 5: Clearing House - SATCOM Standard Throughput  
RF = Risk Factor 0.63
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.46
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.32
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
Magnitude Maturity Factor (Pm) Complexity Factor (Pc)
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Table 14 – Alternative 5: Clearing House - SATCOM Enhanced Throughput 
RF = Risk Factor 0.85
P!"= Probability of Failure Pf=(.1*Pmhw)+(.1*Pmsw)+(.2*Pchw)+.(3*Pcsw)+(.3*Pd) 0.62
C!"= Consequence of FailureCf=(.5*Ct)+(.3*Cc)+(.2*Cf) 0.60
RF - P! + C! -P!C!
Hardware (Pmhw) Software (Pmsw) Hardware (Pchw) Software (Pcsw)
0.1 Low Existing Existing Simple design Simple design
Independent of existing 
system, facility or associate 
contractor
0.3 Minor Minor Redesign Minor redesign Minor increase in complexity Minor increase in complexity
Schedule dependent on 
existing system, facility or 
associate contractor
0.5 Moderate Major change feasible Major change Moderate increase Moderate increase
Performance dependent on 
existing system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.7 Significant Technology available, complex design
New software, similar to 
existing Significant increase
Significant increase in number 
of modules
Schedule dependent on new 
system performance, facility or 
associate contractor
0.9 High State of the art, some research complete
State of the art, never done 
before Extremely complex
Highly complex, very large 
data bases, complex operating 
system
Performance dependent on 
new system performance, 
facility or associate contractor
0.1 Low Minimal or no consequences, unimportant
Budget estimates not 
exceeded, some transfer of 
money
Negligible impact on program, 
slight development schedule 
change compensated by 
available schedule slack
0.3 Minor Small reduction in targeted technical performance
Cost estimates exceeded 
budget by 1 to 5 percent
Minor slip in schedule, some 
adjustment in milestones 
required
0.5 Moderate Some reduction in technical performance
Cost estimate increased by 5 to 
20 percent Small slip in schedule
0.7 Significant Significant degradation in technical performance




0.9 High Technical goals cannot be achieved
Cost estimates increased in 
excess of 50 percent
Large schedule slip that affects 
segment milestones or has 
possible effect on system 
milestones
Probability of Failure (Pf)
Consequences of Failure (Cf)
Dependency Factor (Pd)
Magnitude Schedule Factor (Cs)Technical Factor (Ct) Cost Factor (Cc)
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Table 2: Baseline Calculations 
  Life-Cycle Year 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Total Cost 
  $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K 
RDT&E (network & 
satcom) 
0 0 0 0 2,909 0 0 0 0 0 2,909 
OPN (SPAWAR) 125,895 52,876 22,208 9,327 7,687 3,229 1,356 570 239 100 223,488 
Operation & Support 
(labor) 
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694 




Product development 8,075 4,480 620
Engineering support 443 351 173
T & E 8,682 3,367 553
Management 4,485 3,086 422













Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583
Engineering & Test 6 1 1 1 $298 $58
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Table 3: Baseline Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
29,216,429 29,216,429 29,216,429 29,216,429 2,909 0 0 0 0 0 116,868,626
OPN (SPAWAR) 2,419,467 2,419,467 2,419,467 2,419,467 25,978 10,911 4,583 1,925 808 340 9,722,413
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694




FY08 FY09 FY10 Total
$K $K $K $K
RDT&E 715,169 651,227 474,009 1,840,405
OPN 26,336 26,190 91,951 144,477
0















Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964 $10,582,329 $830,743
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084 $38,648,505 $3,034,017
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968 $34,507,594 $2,708,944
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583 $32,667,189 $2,564,467
Engineering & Test 6 1 1 1 $298 $58 $460,101 $36,119
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Table 4: DiffServ Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
2,890 2,890 0 0 2,928 0 0 0 0 0 8,707
OPN (SPAWAR) 125,895 52,876 22,208 9,327 7,687 3,229 1,356 570 239 100 223,488
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694















Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886 $326
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809 $211
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770 $154
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770 $154
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964 $442
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084 $1,613
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968 $1,440
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583 $1,363
Engineering & Test 8 1 1 1 $298 $77 $77
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Table 5: DiffServ Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,219,322 29,219,322 29,216,433 29,216,433 2,928 0 0 0 0 0 116,874,437
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694





















Cisco 7000Cisco 7000Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886 $326
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809 $211
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770 $154
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770 $154
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964 $442 $10,582,330 $830,743
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084 $1,613 $38,648,509 $3,034,017
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968 $1,440 $34,507,598 $2,708,944
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583 $1,363 $32,667,192 $2,564,467
Engineering & Test 8 1 1 1 $298 $77 $77 $460,101 $36,119
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Table 6: MPLS Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
2,890 2,890 0 0 2,928 0 0 0 0 0 8,707
OPN (SPAWAR) 138,795 52,876 22,208 9,327 7,687 7,687 3,917 1,645 691 290 245,125
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694

















Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K $k
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886 $326 $731
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809 $211 $473
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770 $154 $344
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770 $154 $344
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964 $442 $989
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084 $1,613 $3,612
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968 $1,440 $3,225
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583 $1,363 $3,053
Engineering & Test 8 1 1 1 $298 $77 $77 $129
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Table 7: MPLS Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,219,322 29,219,322 29,216,433 29,216,433 2,928 0 0 0 0 0 116,874,437
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694























Cisco 7000Cisco 7000Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K $k $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886 $326 $731
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809 $211 $473
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770 $154 $344
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770 $154 $344
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $53,964 $442 $989 $10,582,330 $830,743
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $197,084 $1,613 $3,612 $38,648,509 $3,034,017
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $175,968 $1,440 $3,225 $34,507,598 $2,708,944
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $166,583 $1,363 $3,053 $32,667,192 $2,564,467
Engineering & Test 8 1 1 1 $298 $77 $77 $129 $460,101 $36,119
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Table 8: Dedicated Routers Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
2,899 2,899 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,798
OPN (SPAWAR) 128,812 128,794 22,208 9,327 3,917 3,917 3,917 1,645 691 290 303,521
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694











Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $326 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $88 $211 $25,809
Training sites 8 $64 $154 $18,770
NOC 4 4 4 $1,192 $154 $18,770
Force Level 23 $368 $442 $53,964
Group Level 84 $1,344 $1,613 $197,084
Unit Level 75 $1,200 $1,440 $175,968
Submarines 71 $1,136 $1,363 $166,583
Engineering & Test 10 1 1 1 1 $306 $96
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Table 9: Dedicated Routers Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,217,925 29,217,925 29,216,433 29,216,433 2,986 0 0 0 0 0 116,871,701
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694



















Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $25,809
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $18,770
NOC 4 4 4 $1,192 $115 $18,770
Force Level 23 $368 $221 $53,964 $10,582,330 $830,743
Group Level 84 $1,344 $806 $197,084 $38,648,509 $3,034,017
Unit Level 75 $1,200 $720 $175,968 $34,507,598 $2,708,944
Submarines 71 $1,136 $682 $166,583 $32,667,192 $2,564,467
Engineering & Test 10 1 1 1 1 $306 $96 $460,101 $36,119
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Table 10: Routers Upgrade Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
2,909 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,909
OPN (SPAWAR) 169,395 71,146 22,208 9,327 3,917 1,645 3,917 1,645 691 290 284,183
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694










Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $2,465 $163 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $1,595 $106 $25,809
Training sites 8 $1,160 $77 $18,770
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770
Force Level 23 $3,335 $221 $53,964
Group Level 84 $12,180 $806 $197,084
Unit Level 75 $10,875 $720 $175,968
Submarines 71 $10,295 $682 $166,583
Engineering & Test 6 1 1 1 $435 $58
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Table 11: Routers Upgrade Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,219,341 29,216,433 29,216,433 29,216,433 0 0 0 0 0 0 116,868,639
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694














Cisco 7000Cisco 7000Cisco 7000 $K $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $2,465 $163 $39,886
OCONUS 11 $1,595 $106 $25,809
Training sites 8 $1,160 $77 $18,770
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $18,770
Force Level 23 $3,335 $221 $53,964 $10,582,330 $830,743
Group Level 84 $12,180 $806 $197,084 $38,648,509 $3,034,017
Unit Level 75 $10,875 $720 $175,968 $34,507,598 $2,708,944
Submarines 71 $10,295 $682 $166,583 $32,667,192 $2,564,467
Engineering & Test 6 1 1 1 $435 $58 $460,101 $36,119
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Table 12: Routers Upgrade  & MPLS Implementation Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
5,798 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,798
OPN (SPAWAR) 154,095 154,095 22,208 9,327 3,917 1,645 3,917 1,645 691 290 351,832
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694




Router Upgrade & 









Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 $K $K $K $k
CONUS 17 $2,465 $326 $39,886 $731
OCONUS 11 $1,595 $211 $25,809 $473
Training sites 8 $1,160 $154 $18,770 $344
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $154 $18,770 $344
Force Level 23 $3,335 $442 $53,964 $989
Group Level 84 $12,180 $1,613 $197,084 $3,612
Unit Level 75 $10,875 $1,440 $175,968 $3,225
Submarines 71 $10,295 $1,363 $166,583 $3,053
Engineering & Test 10 1 1 1 $435 $96 $129
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Table 13: Routers Upgrade  & MPLS Implementation Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,222,231 29,216,433 29,216,433 29,216,433 0 0 0 0 0 0 116,871,529
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 731,675 768,259 806,672 847,005 889,355 933,823 980,514 1,029,540 1,081,017 8,764,694















Cisco 7000Cisco 7000Cisco 7000 $K $K $K $k
CONUS 17 $2,465 $326 $39,886 $731
OCONUS 11 $1,595 $211 $25,809 $473
Training sites 8 $1,160 $154 $18,770 $344
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $154 $18,770 $344
Force Level 23 $3,335 $442 $53,964 $989
Group Level 84 $12,180 $1,613 $197,084 $3,612
Unit Level 75 $10,875 $1,440 $175,968 $3,225
Submarines 71 $10,295 $1,363 $166,583 $3,053
Engineering & Test 10 1 1 1 $435 $96 $129
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Table 14: Priority Queuing Calculations 
LAN / WAN / ISNS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
$K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K $K
RDT&E (network & 
satcom)
3,024 0 0 0 2,909 0 0 0 0 0 5,933
OPN (SPAWAR) 125,895 52,876 22,208 9,327 7,687 3,229 1,356 570 239 100 223,488
Operation & Support 
(labor)
696,833 385,482 404,756 424,994 446,244 468,556 491,984 516,583 542,412 569,533 4,947,378















Cisco 7000 Cisco 7000 Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $22,065 $163
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $14,277 $106
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $10,383 $77
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $10,383 $77
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $29,852 $221
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $109,025 $806
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $97,344 $720
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $92,152 $682
Engineering & Test 18 1 1 1 $298 $58 $173
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Table 15: Priority Queuing Calculations with SATCOM upgrade 
LAN / WAN / 
ISNS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




29,219,457 29,216,433 29,216,433 29,216,433 2,909 0 0 0 0 0 116,871,663
OPN 
(SPAWAR)




696,833 385,482 404,756 424,994 446,244 468,556 491,984 516,583 542,412 569,533 4,947,378


















Cisco 7000Cisco 7000Cisco 3000 $K $K $K $K
CONUS 17 $136 $163 $22,065 $163
OCONUS 11 $88 $106 $14,277 $106
Training sites 8 $64 $77 $10,383 $77
NOC 4 4 $1,160 $77 $10,383 $77
Force Level 23 $184 $221 $29,852 $221
Group Level 84 $672 $806 $109,025 $806
Unit Level 75 $600 $720 $97,344 $720
Submarines 71 $568 $682 $92,152 $682
Engineering & Test 18 1 1 1 $298 $58 $173
Total cost $3,770 $2,909 $385,482 $3,024  
1 
 
APPENDIX C: Life Cycle Cost Tables 
 
Notes: 
• RDT&E and OPN (SPAWAR) data is based on the budget exhibits for  ISNS, 
SCI and CENTRIXS. 0604231N Tactical Command System, Exhibit R-2a, 
RDT&E Budget Item Justification, May 2009, pages 59-65 
 
• ISNS is expecting 58% budget cut for FY11, so it's assumed the same budget cut 
for the future years.  
 
• SATCOM cost for Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Mobile 
User Objective System (MUOS).  0303109N Satellite Communications, Exhibit 
R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification, May 2009, page 1 
 
• O&S Labor is calculated based on average hourly cost of $120 per hour; there are 
5 personnel at each site, 4 watch-standers at 12/7/365 and one maintenance during 
day.  email from Robert Sotelo, Nov 18, 2010 
 
• The number of routers is calculated based on the FY10 Navy GCCS Force 
Structure. 
 
• Labor for DiffServ and MPLS  implementation is estimated at 8 weeks of 
engineering and test plus 2 weeks of deployment per site per alternative 
implementation. 
 
• MPLS License cost is based on commercial cost of MPLS Management Consol 
cost of $43k for each router. 
 
• Cisco 7000 series routers are estimated at $145k each. 
 
• Cisco 3000 series routers are estimated at $8k each. 
 
• Baseline HW Refresh labor is calculated based on average hourly cost of $4800 
per week, per person for a team of two installers for 1 week per router installed 
plus 6 weeks of engineering and test and the cost of routers for the lab. 
 
• Table 1 shows the time requirements per implementation. 
 















Baseline Hardware Refresh 2 2 2 54 
 
Router Upgrade 2 4 3 81 
 
DiffServ 4 4 10 161 
 
MPLS 4 4 10 161 
 
Dedicated C2 Routers 6 4 10 179 
 
MPLS + Router Upgrade 4 6 3 116 
 
Priority Queues 8 10 4 197 
 
APPENDIX D    DATA ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL MODEL 
 
A.  Results for Run 1; CJTF Functions Timing 
Table 2-1 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function executes as 
soon as it’s activated in the model.  The total time to execute these functions form a baseline for 
comparison with simulation runs that will demonstrate synchronization of functions with data to 
demonstrate Command and Control cycle time. 
Table 1 - Time to Complete CJTF Functions 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all functions 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 11/09 16:15 7784.74 21 11/09 16:24 7863.3 
! ! !2 11/09 16:15 7710.91 22 11/09 16:25 7777.64 
! ! !3 11/09 16:16 7797.3 23 11/09 16:25 7820.73 
! ! !4 11/09 16:16 7777.5 24 11/09 16:26 7747.31 
! ! !5 11/09 16:17 7811.4 25 11/09 16:26 7774.04 
! ! !6 11/09 16:17 7751.45 26 11/09 16:27 7784.35 
! ! !7 11/09 16:18 7747.67 27 11/09 16:27 7793.69 
! ! !8 11/09 16:18 7804.75 28 11/09 16:28 7750.53 
! ! !9 11/09 16:19 7756.60 29 11/09 16:28 7793.96 
! ! !10 11/09 16:19 7753.67 30 11/09 16:29 7724.19 
! ! !11 11/09 16:20 7755.75 31 11/09 16:29 7809.79 
! ! !12 11/09 16:20 7777.64 32 11/09 16:30 7794.76 
! ! !13 11/09 16:21 7752.84 33 11/09 16:30 7777.06 
! ! !14 11/09 16:21 7785.04 34 11/09 16:31 7747.57 
! ! !15 11/09 16:22 7788.03 35 11/09 16:31 7816.31 
! ! !16 11/09 16:22 7733.93 36 11/09 16:32 7815.77 
! ! !17 11/09 16:23 7723.58 37 11/09 16:32 7819.96 
! ! !18 11/09 16:23 7766.76 38 11/09 16:33 7770.97 
! ! !19 11/09 16:23 7775.78 39 11/09 16:33 7745.55 
! ! !20 11/09 16:24 7760.97 40 11/09 16:34 7793.86 
! ! ! 




Table 2 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in run 
1   
Table 2 – Run 1 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7710.91 
2 Maximum 7863.30 
3 Range 152.39 
4 Average 7775.94 
5 Std Dev 31.3528635 
6 Conf 90% 8.15407071 
7 conf 80% 6.35306505 























B.    Results for Run 2; CJTF (Synchronized with Data Triggers) 
Table 3 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 3 - Time to Complete CJTF and JFMCC Cycles (Data & Synchronization) 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario 
between within a CJTF.  Functions within the CJTF must 
wait for triggering data to be received before proceeding.  
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 11/09 15:10 7783.66 21 11/09 15:48 7825.88 
! ! !2 11/09 15:15 7809.89 22 11/09 15:49 7772.17 
! ! !3 11/09 15:18 7816.2 23 11/09 15:50 7788.97 
! ! !4 11/09 15:20 7810.63 24 11/09 15:51 7780.12 
! ! !5 11/09 15:21 7810.32 25 11/09 15:52 7791.91 
! ! !6 11/09 15:23 7790.73 26 11/09 15:53 7802.73 
! ! !7 11/09 15:24 7794.2 27 11/09 15:54 7814.86 
! ! !8 11/09 15:25 7836.38 28 11/09 15:56 7800.17 
! ! !9 11/09 15:26 7814.72 29 11/09 15:57 7830.66 
! ! !10 11/09 15:27 7775.59 30 11/09 15:58 7807.18 
! ! !11 11/09 15:29 7821.37 31 11/09 15:59 7808.47 
! ! !12 11/09 15:30 7763.98 32 11/09 16:00 7810.88 
! ! !13 11/09 15:32 7757.89 33 11/09 16:01 7808.16 
! ! !14 11/09 15:33 7807.73 34 11/09 16:02 7764.42 
! ! !15 11/09 15:34 7766.84 35 11/09 16:04 7792.24 
! ! !16 11/09 15:42 7801.6 36 11/09 16:05 7782.24 
! ! !17 11/09 15:43 7798.79 37 11/09 16:07 7808.58 
! ! !18 11/09 15:45 7810.9 38 11/09 16:08 7833.24 
! ! !19 11/09 15:46 7815.21 39 11/09 16:09 7804.36 
! ! !20 11/09 15:47 7806.1 40 11/09 16:10 7800.02 
! ! ! 
 




Table 4 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in run 
2   
Table 4 – Run 2 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7757.89 
2 Maximum 7836.38 
3 Range 78.49 
4 Average 7800.50 
5 Std Dev 19.2904583 
6 Conf 90% 5.0169504 
7 conf 80% 3.90884668 
8 Variance 372.121782 
 
Once the data was collected to determine the day introduced by synchronizing functions 
in the CJTF Command and Control Cycle, a preliminary test for the equality of variances 
indicates that the variances of the two groups were different.   Table 5 shows the results of F-
Test from Excel Data Analysis tools on both data samples Since the results for P(F<=f)  is < 
0.05; it is assumed  that the variances are from different distributions and a T-Test for Non Equal 
Means would be appropriate. 
Table 5 – Results for F-Test for Run 1 and Run 2 Data 
F-Test Two-Sample for Variances 
 
      !  Variable 1 Variable 2   Variable 3 Variable 4 
!Mean 7775.941 7856.187 Mean 7936.432 8016.677 
!Variance 983.0021 515.9039 Variance 48.80569 -418.292 
!Observations 40 40 Observations 40 40 




 !P(F<=f) one-tail 0.023663 
 
P(F<=f) one-tail 0.023663 
 !
F Critical one-tail 1.704465   
F Critical one-
tail 1.704465   
!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
A T-Test for Non-Equal variances was performed using Excel Data Analysis 
!




!! "#$%#&'(!)! "#$%#&'(!*! !!
Mean 7775.94125 7856.1865 Mean 
Variance 983.0020523 515.9038695 Variance 









t Stat -13.108776 
 
t Stat 
P(T<=t) one-tail 6.12671E-21 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
t Critical one-tail 1.666599659 
 
t Critical one-tail 
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.22534E-20 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 















tools on both data samples.  The results are shown in Table TBS.X.  Since the value of 
P(T<=t) is les than 0.05, this is evidence that these two samples are statistically 
different (providing evidence to reject the null hypothesis of equal means.) 
 
Table 6  - Results of T-Test for Run 1 and Run 2 Data  
! ! ! ! ! ! !





C.    Results for Run 3; CJTF and JFMCC Functions Timing 
Table 7 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function executes as 
soon as it’s activated in the model.  The total time to execute these functions form a baseline for 
comparison with simulation runs that will demonstrate synchronization of functions with data to 
demonstrate Command and Control cycle time. 
Table 7 - Time to Complete CJTF & JFMCC Functions 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF and 
JFMCC  
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 
 
18:01 7810.85 21  18:16 7790.58 
! ! !2 
 
18:01 7802.28 22  18:17 7809.93 
! ! !3 
 
18:02 7795.97 23  18:17 7764.02 
! ! !4 
 
18:02 7791.81 24  18:18 7790.86 
! ! !5 
 
18:03 7804.82 25  18:19 7854.66 
! ! !6 
 
18:04 7776.69 26  18:20 7767.42 
! ! !7 
 
18:05 7778.25 27  18:21 7749.04 
! ! !8 
 
18:05 7801.2 28  18:21 7827.52 
! ! !9 
 
18:06 7794.04 29  18:22 7811.85 
! ! !10 
 
18:07 7826.93 30  18:23 7780.24 
! ! !11 
 
18:08 7784.19 31  18:24 7704.54 
! ! !12 
 
18:09 7794.69 32  18:25 7788.21 
! ! !13 
 
18:10 7767.17 33  18:25 7792.52 
! ! !14 
 
18:10 7818.37 34  18:26 7759.22 
! ! !15 
 
18:11 7768.96 35  18:26 7791.05 
! ! !16 
 
18:12 7789.35 36  18:27 7794.21 
! ! !17 
 
18:12 7792.96 37  18:28 7798.34 
! ! !18 
 
18:13 7788.86 38  18:29 7797.58 
! ! !19 
 
18:14 7802.06 39  18:30 7787.68 
! ! !20 
 
18:15 7759.72 40  18:30 7805.87 
! ! ! 




Table 8 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in run 
3   
Table 8 – Run 3 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7704.54 
2 Maximum 7854.66 
3 Range 150.12 
4 Average 7790.36 
5 Std Dev 24.6215119 
6 Conf 90% 6.40341985 
7 conf 80% 4.98908389 
























D.    Results for Run 4; CJTF, JFMCC (Synchronized with Data Triggers) 
Table 9 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 9 - Time to Complete CJTF, and JFMCC Cycles (Data & Synchronization) 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario 
between within a CJTF and JFMCC.  Functions within 
the CJTF and JFMCC must wait for triggering data to be 
received before proceeding. 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 
 
19:30 11886.59 21  19:49 11875.3 
! ! !2 
 
19:30 11909.47 22  19:50 11816.12 
! ! !3 
 
19:31 11869.97 23  19:51 11885.91 
! ! !4 
 
19:32 11844.63 24  19:52 11849.53 
! ! !5 
 
19:33 11886.44 25  19:53 11861.49 
! ! !6 
 
19:34 11900.84 26  19:54 11886.35 
! ! !7 
 
19:35 11856.99 27  19:55 11830.96 
! ! !8 
 
19:36 11876.61 28  19:56 11797.43 
! ! !9 
 
19:37 11822.57 29  19:58 11876.84 
! ! !10 
 
19:38 11830.48 30  19:58 11851.89 
! ! !11 
 
19:39 11878.05 31  19:59 11917.63 
! ! !12 
 
19:40 11894.37 32  20:00 11814.1 
! ! !13 
 
19:41 11832.43 33  20:01 11875.55 
! ! !14 
 
19:42 11857.42 34  20:02 11866.6 
! ! !15 
 
19:44 11861.6 35  20:03 11900.46 
! ! !16 
 
19:45 11783.37 36  20:04 11875.8 
! ! !17 
 
19:45 11844.79 37  20:05 11910.07 
! ! !18 
 
19:46 11811.08 38  20:07 11799.4 
! ! !19 
 
19:47 11797.72 39  20:08 11872.66 
! ! !20 
 
19:48 11792.95 40  20:09 11769.32 
! ! ! 
Table 10 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 4   




Table 10 – Run 4 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  11769.32 
2 Maximum 11917.63 
3 Range 148.31 
4 Average 11854.29 
5 Std Dev 38.2860547 
6 Conf 90% 9.95721481 
7 conf 80% 7.75794516 


























E.    Results for Run 5; CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One Functions Timing 
Table 11 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function executes as 
soon as it’s activated in the model.  The total time to execute these functions form a baseline for 
comparison with simulation runs that will demonstrate synchronization of functions with data to 
demonstrate Command and Control cycle time. 
Table 11 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One Functions 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF and JFMCC 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 31-Oct 15:10 7783.66 21 31-Oct 15:48 7825.88 
! ! !2 31-Oct 15:15 7809.89 22 31-Oct 15:49 7772.17 
! ! !3 31-Oct 15:18 7816.2 23 31-Oct 15:50 7788.97 
! ! !4 31-Oct 15:20 7810.63 24 31-Oct 15:51 7780.12 
! ! !5 31-Oct 15:21 7810.32 25 31-Oct 15:52 7791.91 
! ! !6 31-Oct 15:23 7790.73 26 31-Oct 15:53 7802.73 
! ! !7 31-Oct 15:24 7794.2 27 31-Oct 15:54 7814.86 
! ! !8 31-Oct 15:25 7836.38 28 31-Oct 15:56 7800.17 
! ! !9 31-Oct 15:26 7814.72 29 31-Oct 15:57 7830.66 
! ! !10 31-Oct 15:27 7775.59 30 31-Oct 15:58 7807.18 
! ! !11 31-Oct 15:29 7821.37 31 31-Oct 15:59 7808.47 
! ! !12 31-Oct 15:30 7763.98 32 31-Oct 16:00 7810.88 
! ! !13 31-Oct 15:32 7757.89 33 31-Oct 16:01 7808.16 
! ! !14 31-Oct 15:33 7807.73 34 31-Oct 16:02 7764.42 
! ! !15 31-Oct 15:34 7766.84 35 31-Oct 16:04 7792.24 
! ! !16 31-Oct 15:42 7801.6 36 31-Oct 16:05 7782.24 
! ! !17 31-Oct 15:43 7798.79 37 31-Oct 16:07 7808.58 
! ! !18 31-Oct 15:45 7810.9 38 31-Oct 16:08 7833.24 
! ! !19 31-Oct 15:46 7815.21 39 31-Oct 16:09 7804.36 
! ! !20 31-Oct 15:47 7806.1 40 31-Oct 16:10 7800.02 
! ! ! 
 
 




Table 12 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 5   
Table 12 – Run 5 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7757.89 
2 Maximum 7836.38 
3 Range 78.49 
4 Average 7800.50 
5 Std Dev 19.2904583 
6 Conf 90% 5.0169504 
7 conf 80% 3.90884668 
























F.    Results for Run 6; CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One (Synchronized with Data Triggers) 
Table 13 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 13 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One Cycles (Data & 
Synchronization) 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario within 
a CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One.  Functions within the 
CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One must wait for triggering 
data to be received before proceeding.  
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
   1 31-Oct 11:30 16391.50 21 31-Oct 12:06 16500.69 
   2 31-Oct 11:32 16417.66 22 31-Oct 12:08 16489.03 
   3 31-Oct 11:34 16407.99 23 31-Oct 12:09 16422.41 
   4 31-Oct 11:36 16406.75 24 31-Oct 12:13 16316.29 
   5 31-Oct 11:37 16461.78 25 31-Oct 12:14 16427.83 
   6 31-Oct 11:38 16392.76 26 31-Oct 12:16 16456.13 
   7 31-Oct 11:41 16501.92 27 31-Oct 12:17 16366.58 
   8 31-Oct 11:42 16367.92 28 31-Oct 12:19 16389.86 
   9 31-Oct 11:45 16375.27 29 31-Oct 12:20 16420 
   10 31-Oct 11:46 16370.63 30 31-Oct 12:22 16459.32 
   11 31-Oct 11:49 16415.46 31 31-Oct 12:23 16412.58 
   12 31-Oct 11:50 16361.57 32 31-Oct 12:25 16381.77 
   13 31-Oct 11:52 16409.25 33 31-Oct 12:26 16439.2 
   14 31-Oct 11:54 16449.92 34 31-Oct 12:28 16449.25 
   15 31-Oct 11:56 16391.58 35 31-Oct 12:29 16371.76 
   16 31-Oct 11:58 16490.81 36 31-Oct 12:31 16318.25 
   17 31-Oct 12:00 16413.74 37 31-Oct 12:32 16362.79 
   18 31-Oct 12:02 16409.76 38 31-Oct 12:34 16356.29 
   19 31-Oct 12:04 16456.9 39 31-Oct 12:36 16433.9 
   20 31-Oct 12:05 16367.83 40 31-Oct 12:37 16375.18 
    




Table 14 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 6   
Table 14 – Run 6 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  16316.29 
2 Maximum 16501.92 
3 Range 185.63 
4 Average 16410.25 
5 Std Dev 45.8112346 
6 Conf 90% 11.9143199 
7 conf 80% 9.2827806 



















G. Results for Run 7; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two Functions Timing 




Table 15 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function executes as 
soon as it’s activated in the model.  The total time to execute these functions form a baseline for 
comparison with simulation runs that will demonstrate synchronization of functions with data to 
demonstrate Command and Control cycle time. 
Table 16 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two Functions 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF 
One, and CTF Two 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 15-Nov 20:08 7856.16 21 15-Nov 20:39 7889.74 
! ! !2 15-Nov 20:11 7886.13 22 15-Nov 20:40 7857.77 
! ! !3 15-Nov 20:13 7861.59 23 15-Nov 20:42 7859.77 
! ! !4 15-Nov 20:14 7867.02 24 15-Nov 20:43 7880.47 
! ! !5 15-Nov 20:15 7853.72 25 15-Nov 20:44 7854.9 
! ! !6 15-Nov 20:17 7897.58 26 15-Nov 20:46 7922.51 
! ! !7 15-Nov 20:18 7892.48 27 15-Nov 20:48 7888.33 
! ! !8 15-Nov 20:19 7855.23 28 15-Nov 20:49 7869.48 
! ! !9 15-Nov 20:20 7848.54 29 15-Nov 20:50 7853.26 
! ! !10 15-Nov 20:22 7830.98 30 15-Nov 20:52 7845.04 
! ! !11 15-Nov 20:24 7859.9 31 15-Nov 20:54 7880.87 
! ! !12 15-Nov 20:25 7855.82 32 15-Nov 20:55 7837.31 
! ! !13 15-Nov 20:27 7881.84 33 15-Nov 20:57 7868.58 
! ! !14 15-Nov 20:28 7839.48 34 15-Nov 20:58 7837.61 
! ! !15 15-Nov 20:29 7850.57 35 15-Nov 21:00 7851.23 
! ! !16 15-Nov 20:31 7842.91 36 15-Nov 21:01 7859.24 
! ! !17 15-Nov 20:32 7839.25 37 15-Nov 21:03 7878.17 
! ! !18 15-Nov 20:34 7877.26 38 15-Nov 21:04 7869.53 
! ! !19 15-Nov 20:35 7872.41 39 15-Nov 21:06 7875.69 
! ! !20 15-Nov 20:37 7872.31 40 15-Nov 21:07 7915.5 
! ! ! 
Table 17 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 7   




Table 17 – Run 7 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7830.98 
2 Maximum 7922.51 
3 Range 91.53 
4 Average 7865.90 
5 Std Dev 20.8426109 
6 Conf 90% 5.42062524 
7 conf 80% 4.22336106 

























H.    Results for Run 8; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two (Synchronized with Data 
Triggers) 
Table 18 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 18 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two Cycles (Data 
& Synchronization) 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario within 
a CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two.  Functions 
within the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two must 
wait for triggering data to be received before proceeding. 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 11-Nov 19:59 16530.08 21 11-Nov 20:37 16537.14 
! ! !2 11-Nov 20:02 16504.35 22 11-Nov 20:39 16478.96 
! ! !3 11-Nov 20:04 16584.11 23 11-Nov 20:41 16519.59 
! ! !4 11-Nov 20:05 16543.29 24 11-Nov 20:43 16567.28 
! ! !5 11-Nov 20:07 16513.42 25 11-Nov 20:45 16501.04 
! ! !6 11-Nov 20:09 16544.91 26 11-Nov 20:47 16508.96 
! ! !7 11-Nov 20:11 16570.89 27 11-Nov 20:49 16582.98 
! ! !8 11-Nov 20:13 16536.23 28 11-Nov 20:50 16561.55 
! ! !9 11-Nov 20:15 16518.02 29 11-Nov 20:52 16521.45 
! ! !10 11-Nov 20:17 16465.16 30 11-Nov 20:54 16482.21 
! ! !11 11-Nov 20:19 16526.74 31 11-Nov 20:56 16542.41 
! ! !12 11-Nov 20:21 16610.29 32 11-Nov 20:58 16634.68 
! ! !13 11-Nov 20:23 16516.89 33 11-Nov 21:00 16525.16 
! ! !14 11-Nov 20:25 16506.46 34 11-Nov 21:02 16559.82 
! ! !15 11-Nov 20:26 16556 35 11-Nov 21:04 16496.89 
! ! !16 11-Nov 20:28 16538.75 36 11-Nov 21:06 16574.57 
! ! !17 11-Nov 20:29 16439.31 37 11-Nov 21:08 16500.24 
! ! !18 11-Nov 20:31 16582.4 38 11-Nov 21:09 16553.09 
! ! !19 11-Nov 20:33 16558.44 39 11-Nov 21:11 16519.08 
! ! !20 11-Nov 20:35 16566.8 40 11-Nov 21:13 16582.07 
! ! ! 





Table 19 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 8   
Table 19 – Run 8 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  16439.31 
2 Maximum 16634.68 
3 Range 195.37 
4 Average 16536.54 
5 Std Dev 39.4275083 
6 Conf 90% 10.2540774 
7 conf 80% 7.98923915 






















I.    Results for Run 9; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two and CTF Three Functions 
Timing 
Table 20 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function executes as 
soon as it’s activated in the model.  The total time to execute these functions form a baseline for 
comparison with simulation runs that will demonstrate synchronization of functions with data to 
demonstrate Command and Control cycle time. 
Table 20 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
Functions 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One,  CTF Two, and CTF Three 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 15-Nov 21:26 7903.3 21 16-Nov 15:40 7887.51 
! ! !2 15-Nov 21:27 7884.47 22 16-Nov 15:42 7876.52 
! ! !3 15-Nov 21:28 7855.05 23 16-Nov 15:43 7870.85 
! ! !4 15-Nov 21:29 7848.8 24 16-Nov 15:45 7850.35 
! ! !5 15-Nov 21:32 7875.44 25 16-Nov 15:47 7866.42 
! ! !6 15-Nov 21:34 7894.69 26 16-Nov 15:49 7884.37 
! ! !7 15-Nov 21:36 7896.79 27 16-Nov 15:51 7887.64 
! ! !8 15-Nov 21:38 7848.4 28 16-Nov 15:53 7849.46 
! ! !9 15-Nov 21:40 7865.95 29 16-Nov 15:54 7841.09 
! ! !10 15-Nov 21:42 7849.87 30 16-Nov 15:56 7853.89 
! ! !11 15-Nov 21:43 7867.06 31 16-Nov 15:57 7843.16 
! ! !12 15-Nov 21:45 7915.3 32 16-Nov 15:59 7887 
! ! !13 15-Nov 21:48 7889.43 33 16-Nov 16:01 7890.83 
! ! !14 15-Nov 21:26 7903.3 34 16-Nov 16:03 7887.61 
! ! !15 15-Nov 21:27 7884.47 35 16-Nov 16:05 7835.87 
! ! !16 15-Nov 21:28 7855.05 36 16-Nov 16:06 7850.74 
! ! !17 15-Nov 21:29 7848.8 37 16-Nov 16:08 7867.61 
! ! !18 15-Nov 21:32 7875.44 38 16-Nov 16:11 7885.49 
! ! !19 15-Nov 21:34 7894.69 39 16-Nov 16:12 7861.47 
! ! !20 15-Nov 21:36 7896.79 40 16-Nov 16:14 7868.84 
! ! ! 




Table TBS-21 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data 
in run 9   
Table TBS-21 – Run 9 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  7835.87 
2 Maximum 7915.30 
3 Range 79.43 
4 Average 7871.14 
5 Std Dev 18.9843311 
6 Conf 90% 4.93733461 
7 conf 80% 3.84681579 























J.    Results for Run 10; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
(Synchronized with Data Triggers) 
Table 22 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 22 – Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
Cycles (Data & Synchronization) 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario within 
a CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three.  
Functions within the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, 
and CTF Three must wait for triggering data to be 
received before proceeding. 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 11-Nov 16:06 16632.95 21 11-Nov 16:56 16618.68 
! ! !2 11-Nov 16:09 16639.33 22 11-Nov 16:58 16576.28 
! ! !3 11-Nov 16:11 16619.29 23 11-Nov 17:00 16624.1 
! ! !4 11-Nov 16:14 16543.8 24 11-Nov 17:03 16679.91 
! ! !5 11-Nov 16:16 16607.94 25 11-Nov 17:06 16626.43 
! ! !6 11-Nov 16:19 16600.37 26 11-Nov 17:08 16590.75 
! ! !7 11-Nov 16:21 16630.07 27 11-Nov 17:10 16629.21 
! ! !8 11-Nov 16:24 16643.74 28 11-Nov 17:12 16554.8 
! ! !9 11-Nov 16:26 16602.16 29 11-Nov 17:15 16631.45 
! ! !10 11-Nov 16:28 16532.79 30 11-Nov 17:17 16623.78 
! ! !11 11-Nov 16:31 16554.7 31 11-Nov 17:19 16642.74 
! ! !12 11-Nov 16:33 16571.51 32 11-Nov 17:21 16613.45 
! ! !13 11-Nov 16:36 16592.62 33 11-Nov 17:23 16639.67 
! ! !14 11-Nov 16:38 16646.16 34 11-Nov 17:26 16566.05 
! ! !15 11-Nov 16:40 16626.41 35 11-Nov 17:29 16592.72 
! ! !16 11-Nov 16:43 16574.22 36 11-Nov 17:31 16599.62 
! ! !17 11-Nov 16:46 16572.29 37 11-Nov 17:33 16650.19 
! ! !18 11-Nov 16:48 16575.02 38 11-Nov 17:35 16573.83 
! ! !19 11-Nov 16:51 16555.87 39 11-Nov 17:37 16626.15 
! ! !20 11-Nov 16:54 16644.78 40 11-Nov 17:40 16599.37 
! ! ! 




Table 23 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 9   
Table 23 – Run 10 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  16532.79 
2 Maximum 16679.91 
3 Range 147.12 
4 Average 16605.63 
5 Std Dev 34.2844132 
6 Conf 90% 8.91649113 
7 conf 80% 6.94708817 
























K.    Analysis of Data Variances 
In the data collected in paragraphs A, C, E, G and –I of this appendix, act as a control or 
basis for analysis of the various architecture options.  Each of these runs represents time required 
to complete the Command and Control cycles unencumbered by any delays that may be created 
waiting for available data or responses.  In our project’s case, each functions execution time was 
determined at random by the COREsim tool.   To be sure that each sample of the control data is 
statically unique, an ANOVA test using Excel Data Analysis tools was used on the samples. 
Table TBS-23 contains the results of the ANOVA test 
 
Table 24 - Analysis of Variances 
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L.    Results for Run 11; CJTF and JFMCC Functions Timing using the Clearinghouse 
Approach  
Table 25 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 25 - Time to Complete CJTF and JFMCC Functions using Clearinghouse 
Approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF and JFMCC 
This approach simulates a data clearinghouse versus the 
stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 19-Nov 20:06 8069.11 21 19-Nov 20:23 8036.71 
! ! !2 19-Nov 20:08 8067.4 22 19-Nov 20:24 8082.88 
! ! !3 19-Nov 20:09 8076.24 23 19-Nov 20:25 8106.75 
! ! !4 19-Nov 20:10 8059 24 19-Nov 20:26 8099.34 
! ! !5 19-Nov 20:10 8091.61 25 19-Nov 20:28 8078.49 
! ! !6 19-Nov 20:11 8077.16 26 19-Nov 20:29 8057.75 
! ! !7 19-Nov 20:12 8076.57 27 19-Nov 20:29 8081.43 
! ! !8 19-Nov 20:13 8089.68 28 19-Nov 20:30 8073.44 
! ! !9 19-Nov 20:13 8087.76 29 19-Nov 20:31 8103.25 
! ! !10 19-Nov 20:14 8092.07 30 19-Nov 20:32 8071.18 
! ! !11 19-Nov 20:15 8101.21 31 19-Nov 20:33 8059.12 
! ! !12 19-Nov 20:15 8097.53 32 19-Nov 20:34 8065.77 
! ! !13 19-Nov 20:16 8106.32 33 19-Nov 20:35 8084.11 
! ! !14 19-Nov 20:17 8063.82 34 19-Nov 20:35 8093.63 
! ! !15 19-Nov 20:18 8076.61 35 19-Nov 20:36 8089.46 
! ! !16 19-Nov 20:19 8068.84 36 19-Nov 20:37 8083.69 
! ! !17 19-Nov 20:20 8092.03 37 19-Nov 20:38 8110.73 
! ! !18 19-Nov 20:20 8076.73 38 19-Nov 20:38 8099.49 
! ! !19 19-Nov 20:21 8054.83 39 19-Nov 20:39 8094.96 
! ! !20 19-Nov 20:22 8098.25 40 19-Nov 20:40 8105.15 
! ! ! 





Table 26 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 11  
Table 26 – Run 10 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  8036.71 
2 Maximum 8110.73 
3 Range 74.02 
4 Average 8082.50 
5 Std Dev 16.9186692 
6 Conf 90% 4.40010926 
7 conf 80% 3.42824846 





















M.    Results for Run 12; CJTF and JFMCC (synchronized with Data Triggers) using the 
Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 27 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 27 - Time to Complete CJTF and JFMCC (Data & Synchronization) using the 
clearinghouse approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario 
within a CJTF and JFMCC.  Functions within the CJTF 
and JFMCC must wait for triggering data to be received 
before proceeding.  This approach simulates a data 
clearinghouse versus the stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 
Core Project Name 









Run Result  
! ! !1 17-Nov 15:11 12436.12 21 17-Nov 15:31 12396.71 
! ! !2 17-Nov 15:13 12380.85 22 17-Nov 15:32 12435.82 
! ! !3 17-Nov 15:13 12406.1 23 17-Nov 15:32 12421.97 
! ! !4 17-Nov 15:15 12394.71 24 17-Nov 15:33 12433.36 
! ! !5 17-Nov 15:16 12401.23 25 17-Nov 15:34 12389.02 
! ! !6 17-Nov 15:17 12468.81 26 17-Nov 15:34 12417.77 
! ! !7 17-Nov 15:18 12370.69 27 17-Nov 15:35 12439.84 
! ! !8 17-Nov 15:19 12438.97 28 17-Nov 15:37 12438.3 
! ! !9 17-Nov 15:20 12434.56 29 17-Nov 15:38 12455.33 
! ! !10 17-Nov 15:21 12428.25 30 17-Nov 15:39 12390.78 
! ! !11 17-Nov 15:22 12394.97 31 17-Nov 15:40 12412.48 
! ! !12 17-Nov 15:23 12417.21 32 17-Nov 15:41 12433.76 
! ! !13 17-Nov 15:23 12407.67 33 17-Nov 15:42 12449.74 
! ! !14 17-Nov 15:24 12403.58 34 17-Nov 15:43 12413.65 
! ! !15 17-Nov 15:25 12447.84 35 17-Nov 15:44 12414.04 
! ! !16 17-Nov 15:26 12380.1 36 17-Nov 15:45 12441.77 
! ! !17 17-Nov 15:27 12458.40 37 17-Nov 15:46 12431.55 
! ! !18 17-Nov 15:28 12417.71 38 17-Nov 15:47 12445.9 
! ! !19 17-Nov 15:28 12389.65 39 17-Nov 15:48 12417.52 
! ! !20 17-Nov 15:30 12446.96 40 17-Nov 15:49 12400.57 
! ! !





Table 28 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 11  
Table 28 – Run 12 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  12370.69 
2 Maximum 12468.81 
3 Range 98.12 
4 Average 12420.11 
5 Std Dev 24.0832781 
6 Conf 90% 6.26343914 
7 conf 80% 4.880021 





















N.    Results for Run 13; CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One, Functions Timing using the 
Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 29 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 29 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One Functions using 
Clearinghouse Approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF, JFMCC, 
and CTF One. This approach simulates a data 
clearinghouse versus the stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 19-Nov 19:10 8235 21 19-Nov 19:32 8158.91 
! ! !2 19-Nov 19:11 8155.4 22 19-Nov 19:33 8221.78 
! ! !3 19-Nov 19:13 8203.49 23 19-Nov 19:34 8208.18 
! ! !4 19-Nov 19:14 8157.32 24 19-Nov 19:35 8205.38 
! ! !5 19-Nov 19:15 8168.61 25 19-Nov 19:36 8194.63 
! ! !6 19-Nov 19:16 8213.16 26 19-Nov 19:37 8222.33 
! ! !7 19-Nov 19:17 8177.43 27 19-Nov 19:38 8189.96 
! ! !8 19-Nov 19:18 8206.82 28 19-Nov 19:40 8170.97 
! ! !9 19-Nov 19:19 8192.54 29 19-Nov 19:41 8197.56 
! ! !10 19-Nov 19:20 8212.19 30 19-Nov 19:42 8229.32 
! ! !11 19-Nov 19:21 8198.25 31 19-Nov 19:43 8208.07 
! ! !12 19-Nov 19:22 8221.5 32 19-Nov 19:44 8210.56 
! ! !13 19-Nov 19:23 8209.42 33 19-Nov 19:45 8194.28 
! ! !14 19-Nov 19:25 8190.05 34 19-Nov 19:46 8186.8 
! ! !15 19-Nov 19:25 8218.5 35 19-Nov 19:47 8201.68 
! ! !16 19-Nov 19:27 8216.63 36 19-Nov 19:48 8216.84 
! ! !17 19-Nov 19:28 8179.89 37 19-Nov 19:50 8215.58 
! ! !18 19-Nov 19:29 8208.21 38 19-Nov 19:51 8220.61 
! ! !19 19-Nov 19:30 8209.25 39 19-Nov 19:52 8209.59 
! ! !20 19-Nov 19:31 8229.72 40 19-Nov 19:53 8217.84 
! ! ! 




Table 30 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 11  
Table 30 – Run 13 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 




5 Std Dev "610%3"02"!
6 Conf 90% %1"$"00"$3!
























O.    Results for Run 14; CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One (Synchronized with Data Triggers) 
using the Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 31 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 31 Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One (Data & 
Synchronization) using the clearinghouse approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario 
within a CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One.  Functions 
within the CJTF, JFMCC, and CTF One must wait for 
triggering data to be received before proceeding.  This 
approach simulates a data clearinghouse versus the 
stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 
Core Project Name 









Run Result  
! ! !1 17-Nov 14:14 15964.21 21 17-Nov 14:42 15912.63 
! ! !2 17-Nov 14:16 15957.55 22 17-Nov 14:44 15903.4 
! ! !3 17-Nov 14:17 16016.13 23 17-Nov 14:45 15930.34 
! ! !4 17-Nov 14:09 16029.77 24 17-Nov 14:47 15947.02 
! ! !5 17-Nov 14:20 15945.85 25 17-Nov 14:48 15898.02 
! ! !6 17-Nov 14:22 15945.84 26 17-Nov 14:50 15985.6 
! ! !7 17-Nov 14:23 15948.52 27 17-Nov 14:51 15907.73 
! ! !8 17-Nov 14:24 15908.63 28 17-Nov 14:52 15944.34 
! ! !9 17-Nov 14:26 15955.38 29 17-Nov 14:54 15942.09 
! ! !10 17-Nov 14:27 15961.58 30 17-Nov 14:55 15994.07 
! ! !11 17-Nov 14:28 15958.54 31 17-Nov 14:56 16013.56 
! ! !12 17-Nov 14:30 15937.76 32 17-Nov 14:57 15928.86 
! ! !13 17-Nov 14:31 15976.82 33 17-Nov 14:59 15951.82 
! ! !14 17-Nov 14:33 15905.41 34 17-Nov 15:01 16012.25 
! ! !15 17-Nov 14:34 15959.81 35 17-Nov 15:02 15946.58 
! ! !16 17-Nov 14:36 15982.67 36 17-Nov 15:04 15986.6 
! ! !17 17-Nov 14:37 15980.30 37 17-Nov 15:05 15946.41 
! ! !18 17-Nov 14:38 15976.96 38 17-Nov 16:06 15967.39 
! ! !19 17-Nov 14:40 15936.63 39 17-Nov 15:08 16016.32 
! ! !




20 17-Nov 14:41 15867.35 40 17-Nov 15:09 15941.92 
! ! ! 
 
Table 32 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 11  
Table 32 – Run 14 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  15867.35 
2 Maximum 16029.77 
3 Range 162.42 
4 Average 15954.82 
5 Std Dev 36.1545329 
6 Conf 90% 9.402861 
7 conf 80% 7.32603256 




















P.    Results for Run 15; Results for Run 16; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two 
Functions Timing using the Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 33 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 33 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One and CTF Two Functions 
using Clearinghouse Approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF, JFMCC, 
CTF One, and CTF Two This approach simulates a data 
clearinghouse versus the stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 19-Nov 17:44 8251.01 21 19-Nov 18:13 8272.3 
! ! !2 19-Nov 17:46 8251.42 22 19-Nov 18:15 8297.73 
! ! !3 19-Nov 17:47 8292.59 23 19-Nov 18:16 8279.29 
! ! !4 19-Nov 17:48 8283.84 24 19-Nov 18:17 8269.39 
! ! !5 19-Nov 17:51 8282.54 25 19-Nov 18:18 8288 
! ! !6 19-Nov 17:52 8287.14 26 19-Nov 18:20 8275.8 
! ! !7 19-Nov 17:53 8297.68 27 19-Nov 18:21 8298.65 
! ! !8 19-Nov 17:54 8285.58 28 19-Nov 18:23 8270.11 
! ! !9 19-Nov 17:55 8266.33 29 19-Nov 18:24 8289.05 
! ! !10 19-Nov 17:57 8295.04 30 19-Nov 18:25 8262.22 
! ! !11 19-Nov 17:59 8236.68 31 19-Nov 18:26 8271.27 
! ! !12 19-Nov 18:01 8291.24 32 19-Nov 18:29 8280.66 
! ! !13 19-Nov 18:03 8278.19 33 19-Nov 18:30 8251.29 
! ! !14 19-Nov 18:04 8257.9 34 19-Nov 18:31 8291.73 
! ! !15 19-Nov 18:05 8249.25 35 19-Nov 18:32 8265.87 
! ! !16 19-Nov 18:06 8268.88 36 19-Nov 18:33 8272.8 
! ! !17 19-Nov 18:07 8273.43 37 19-Nov 18:35 8284.24 
! ! !18 19-Nov 18:08 8259.83 38 19-Nov 18:37 8294.75 
! ! !19 19-Nov 18:09 8249.46 39 19-Nov 18:38 8289.8 
! ! !20 19-Nov 18:11 8292.84 40 19-Nov 18:39 8273.38 
! ! !






Table 34 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 13  
Table 34 – Run 15 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  8236.68 
2 Maximum 8298.65 
3 Range 61.97 
4 Average 8275.73 
5 Std Dev 16.096058 
6 Conf 90% 4.1861693 
7 conf 80% 3.26156184 





















Q.    Results for Run 16; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two (Synchronized with Data 
Triggers) using the Clearinghouse Approach 
Table 35 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 35 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two (Data & 
Synchronization) using the clearinghouse approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario within 
a CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two.  Functions 
within the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, and CTF Two must 
wait for triggering data to be received before proceeding.  
This approach simulates a data clearinghouse versus the 
stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name Capstone 









Run Result  
! ! !1 17-Nov 6:42 16170.07 21 17-Nov 13:37 16125.1 
! ! !2 17-Nov 6:45 16105.81 22 17-Nov 13:38 16193.22 
! ! !3 17-Nov 6:49 16161.82 23 17-Nov 13:40 16154.39 
! ! !4 17-Nov 6:52 16153.13 24 17-Nov 13:42 16129.8 
! ! !5 17-Nov 6:54 16143.12 25 17-Nov 13:43 16122.91 
! ! !6 17-Nov 6:56 16241.51 26 17-Nov 13:45 16178.44 
! ! !7 17-Nov 7:08 16198.7 27 17-Nov 13:47 16153.95 
! ! !8 17-Nov 7:10 16166.2 28 17-Nov 13:49 16186.8 
! ! !9 17-Nov 7:12 16126.19 29 17-Nov 13:50 16131.51 
! ! !10 17-Nov 7:14 16179.31 30 17-Nov 13:52 16160.11 
! ! !11 17-Nov 7:17 16148.62 31 17-Nov 13:53 16096.47 
! ! !12 17-Nov 7:18 16150.4 32 17-Nov 13:56 16099.12 
! ! !13 17-Nov 7:23 16172.95 33 17-Nov 13:57 16110.18 
! ! !14 17-Nov 7:25 16152.37 34 17-Nov 13:59 16113.63 
! ! !15 17-Nov 7:26 16116.37 35 17-Nov 14:01 16110.04 
! ! !16 17-Nov 7:28 16178.38 36 17-Nov 14:03 16234.66 
! ! !17 17-Nov 7:30 16126.55 37 17-Nov 14:05 16189.68 
! ! !18 17-Nov 7:33 16211.51 38 17-Nov 14:07 16108.66 
! ! !19 17-Nov 7:35 16091.51 39 17-Nov 14:08 16100.92 
! ! !




20 17-Nov 7:40 16146.38 40 17-Nov 14:10 16165.3 
! ! ! 
Table 36 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 13  
Table 36 – Run 15 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  16091.51 
2 Maximum 16241.51 
3 Range 150.00 
4 Average 16150.14 
5 Std Dev 37.3991787 
6 Conf 90% 9.72656126 
7 conf 80% 7.57823651 





















R.    Results for Run 17; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three Functions 
Timing using the Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 37 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 37 - Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
Functions using Clearinghouse Approach 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a data only scenario (all function 
execute as soon as activated) with the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF 
One, CTF Two, and CTF Three. This approach simulates a 
data clearinghouse versus the stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name 
Capstone 
Core Project Name 









Run Result  
! ! !1 17-Nov 20:55 8329.5 21 17-Nov 21:28 8306.24 
! ! !2 17-Nov 20:56 8314.67 22 17-Nov 21:30 8319.59 
! ! !3 17-Nov 20:58 8314.3 23 17-Nov 21:33 8310.59 
! ! !4 17-Nov 21:00 8349.7 24 17-Nov 21:34 8329.23 
! ! !5 17-Nov 21:01 8326.43 25 17-Nov 21:36 8336.46 
! ! !6 17-Nov 21:03 8307.79 26 17-Nov 21:37 8329.79 
! ! !7 17-Nov 21:04 8335.31 27 17-Nov 21:39 8328.21 
! ! !8 17-Nov 21:06 8317.86 28 17-Nov 21:41 8325.31 
! ! !9 17-Nov 21:08 8285.30 29 17-Nov 21:42 8359.19 
! ! !10 17-Nov 21:10 8320.41 30 17-Nov 21:44 8344.99 
! ! !11 17-Nov 21:11 8322.77 31 17-Nov 21:46 8328.69 
! ! !12 17-Nov 21:14 8334.54 32 17-Nov 21:47 8344.23 
! ! !13 17-Nov 21:15 8341.43 33 17-Nov 21:51 8336.44 
! ! !14 17-Nov 21:16 8340.38 34 17-Nov 21:52 8328.75 
! ! !15 17-Nov 21:19 8326.5 35 17-Nov 21:53 8342.35 
! ! !16 17-Nov 21:20 8351.24 36 17-Nov 21:55 8341.63 
! ! !17 17-Nov 21:21 8353.46 37 17-Nov 21:57 8351.82 
! ! !18 17-Nov 21:23 8314.64 38 17-Nov 21:58 8347.74 
! ! !19 17-Nov 21:25 8334.69 39 17-Nov 22:00 8336.94 
! ! !20 17-Nov 21:27 8338.74 40 17-Nov 22:02 8342.01 
! ! !





Table 38 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 13  
Table 38 – Run 15 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  8285.30 
2 Maximum 8359.19 
3 Range 73.89 
4 Average 8331.25 
5 Std Dev 15.1496167 
6 Conf 90% 3.94002434 
7 conf 80% 3.0697834 





















S.    Results for Run 18; CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
(Synchronized with Data Triggers) using the Clearinghouse Approach  
Table 39 contains the results from simulations using COREsim to model 50 cycles of the 
Command and Control decision cycle as discussed in paragraph IV.F.  Each function cannot 
execute until all data for the function is available.  This models the total time, including 
synchronizing effects, within and between organization to complete the Command and Control 
cycles. 
Table 39 Time to Complete CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three 
(Data & Synchronization) using the clearinghouse approach 
 
Model Summary 
This model simulates a synchronous data scenario within 
a CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF Two, and CTF Three.  
Functions within the CJTF, JFMCC, CTF One, CTF 
Two, and CTF Three must wait for triggering data to be 
received before proceeding.  This approach simulates a 
data clearinghouse versus the stacked C2 wheels 
CORE Repository Name 
Capstone 
Core Project Name 









Run Result  
! ! !1 11-Nov 21:25 16217.26 21 11-Nov 22:05 16223.19 
! ! !2 11-Nov 21:27 16135.44 22 11-Nov 22:07 16133.58 
! ! !3 11-Nov 21:29 16150.44 23 11-Nov 22:09 16192.13 
! ! !4 11-Nov 21:31 16194.77 24 11-Nov 22:11 16204.71 
! ! !5 11-Nov 21:33 16205.77 25 11-Nov 22:13 16229.65 
! ! !6 11-Nov 21:35 16245.62 26 11-Nov 22:15 16136.13 
! ! !7 11-Nov 21:37 16157.09 27 11-Nov 22:17 16150.38 
! ! !8 11-Nov 21:39 16163.38 28 11-Nov 22:19 16220.29 
! ! !9 11-Nov 21:41 16223.92 29 11-Nov 22:21 16177.11 
! ! !10 11-Nov 21:43 16181.01 30 11-Nov 22:23 16216.74 
! ! !11 11-Nov 21:45 16245.79 31 11-Nov 22:25 16223.02 
! ! !12 11-Nov 21:47 16237.07 32 11-Nov 22:27 16221.46 
! ! !13 11-Nov 21:49 16210.68 33 11-Nov 22:29 16170.65 
! ! !14 11-Nov 21:51 16193.3 34 11-Nov 22:31 16158.37 
! ! !15 11-Nov 21:53 16173.31 35 11-Nov 22:33 16187.61 
! ! !16 11-Nov 21:55 16174.18 36 11-Nov 22:35 16189.37 
! ! !17 11-Nov 21:57 16162.66 37 11-Nov 22:37 16101.49 
! ! !18 11-Nov 21:59 16231.23 38 11-Nov 10:39 16139.46 
! ! !




19 11-Nov 22:01 16202.02 39 11-Nov 10:41 16126.71 
! ! !20 11-Nov 22:03 16215.95 40 11-Nov 22:43 16202.8 
! ! ! 
Table 40 provides statistics calculated (using Microsoft Excel) from the sample data in 
run 13  
Table 40 – Run 15 Statistics 
 Statistic Value 
1 Minimum  16101.49 
2 Maximum 16245.79 
3 Range 144.30 
4 Average 16188.14 
5 Std Dev 36.3257834 
6 Conf 90% 9.44739882 
7 conf 80% 7.36073323 






















T.    Analysis of Data Variances (for Clearing House Approach) 
The data collected in paragraphs L, N, P, and R of this appendix, act as a control or basis 
for analysis of the various architecture options.  Each of these runs represents time required to 
complete the Command and Control cycles (using the clearinghouse approach)  unencumbered 
by any delays that may be created waiting for available data or responses.  In our project’s case, 
each functions execution time was determined at random by the COREsim tool.   To be sure that 
each sample of the control data is statically unique, an ANOVA test using Excel Data Analysis 
tools was used on the samples. Table TBS-23 contains the results of the ANOVA test 
 
Table 41  Analysis of Variances (for Clearinghouse Approach) 
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Since the P-value is < 0.05, this is evidence that each of the data samples is statistically 

































APPENDIX E    OPERATIONAL EVENT TRACE DESCRIPTION 
(OV-6C) 




B.  NAVY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS EXAMPLE (AFLOAT – TO –
AFLOAT)  
 




C.  C2 CYCLE ACTIVATION  
 
 










E.  PROVIDE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
 
 







































































APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  
AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY MODEL (OV5-B) 
"
A. OV-5a – Operational Activity Decomposition Tree 
 
"







" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  















" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  






Figure F-4.  3 – Perform CJTF Art of the C2 
 
"
Figure F-5.  3.1 – Stand Up C2 Watch (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  







Figure F-6.  3.2 – Maintain Alignment (at CJTF) 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-7.  3.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-8.  3.4 – Advance the Plan (at CJTF) 
"
Figure F-9.  3.5 – Comply with Procedure (at CJTF) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-10.  3.6 – Counter the Enemy (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-11.  3.7 – Adjust Apportment (at CJTF) 
"
Figure F-12.  4 – Perform MOC art of C2 
"
Figure F-13.  4.1 – Stand Up C2 Watch (at JFMCC) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-14.  4.2 – Maintain Alignment (at JFMCC) 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-15.  4.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at JFMCC) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-16.  4.4 – Advance the Plan (at JFMCC) 
"
Figure F-17.  4.5 – Comply with Procedure (at JFMCC) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-18.  4.6 – Counter the Enemy (at JFMCC) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-19.  4.7 – Adjust Apportment (at JFMCC) 
"
Figure F-20.  5 – Perform CTF One Art of C2 
"
Figure F-21.  5.1 – Stand Up C2 Watch (at CTF One) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-22.  5.2 – Maintain Alignment (at CTF One) 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-23.  5.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at CTF One) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-24.  5.4 – Advance the Plan (at CTF One) 
"
Figure F-25.  5.5 – Comply with Procudure (at CTF One) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-26.  5.6 – Counter the Enemy (at CTF One) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-27.  5.7 – Adjust Apportment (at CTF One) 
"
Figure F-28.  6 – Perform CTF Two Art of C2 
"
Figure F-29.  6.1 – Stand Up C2 Watch (at CTF Two) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-30.  6.2 – Maintain Alignment (at CTF Two) 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-31.  6.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at CTF Two) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-32.  6.4 – Advance the Plan (at CTF Two) 
"
Figure F-33.  6.5 – Comply with Procedure (at CTF Two) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-34.  6.6 – Counter the Enemy (at CTF Two) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-35.  6.7 – Adjust Apportment (at CTF Two) 
"
Figure F-36.  7 – Perform CTF Three Art of C2 
 
"
Figure F-37.  7.1 – Stand Up C2 Watch (at CTF Three) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-38.  7.2 – Maintain Alignment (at CTF Three) 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-39.  7.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at CTF Three) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-40.  7.4 – Advance the Plan (at CTF Three) 
"
Figure F-41.  7.5 – Comply with Procedure (at CTF Three) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-42.  7.6 – Counter the Enemy (at CTF Three) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  














B. OV-5b – Operational Activity Model (Functional Flow Block Diagram) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-44.  0 – Perform FBM Functions 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-45.  1 – Perform Operations Tactical Planning 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-46.  1.1 – Perform CTJF Planning 
 
Figure F-47.  1.2 – Perform Operations Tactical Planning 
 
 
Figure F-48.  1.3 – Perform CTF One Planning 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-49.  2 – Provide AOR Overwatch 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  






" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-49.  2.1 – Monitor Enemy 
 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-50.  2.2 – Anticipate Enemy Intent 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  






Figure F-51.  3 – Perform CJTF Art of the C2 
"
Figure F-52.  3.2 – Maintain Alignment (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  







Figure F-53.  3.3 – Provide Situational Awareness (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  








Figure F-56.  3.6 – Counter the Enemy (at CJTF) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  





Figure F-57.  3.7 – Adjust Apportment (at CJTF) 
"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




Figure F-58.  4 – Perform MOC art of C2 
"




" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  









" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  






Figure F-63.  4.6 – Counter the Enemy (at JFMCC) 
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  












" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  




C.  Clearing House OV-5b 
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ffbd Perform CJTF Art of the C2"
Project:"
Trusted COP Flat (with trig and 3 CTF)" Organization:" Date:" November 21, 2010"
" APPENDIX F OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY DECOMPOSITION TREE (OV-5A)  



















Command Task Force Elements 
 
Figure xx. below shows the basic network topology for the Combined Task Force Operational 
Facility (OPFAC).  There are three (CTF1, CTF2, and CTF3) OPFACs in the baseline scenario.  





















































Satellite Operational Facilities 
 
In order to meet the requirements for the number of SATCOM circuits, the model 
employs three DSCS satellites.  Three satellites were required as JCSS severely limits the 
number of SATCOM links.  Figure 2  below shows the satellite Operational facility containing 





Figure 2. Satellite Operational Facility 
 
  







The JFMCC OPFAC contains the land-based SATCOM connections to the deployed 
CTFs.   In addition, the MOC server is located in the JFMCC operational facility.  This server 





























































The CJTF OPFAC has a fiber connection to the JFMCC.   The 
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Figure 5.  CTF Network Topology with upgraded 7500 series routers. 
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Table 4.  Alternative 2 Link Report 
  






A dedicated combat router was used to route C2 traffic in this scenario.  Figure 6 below 




Figure 6. CTF OPFAC Alternative 3 
 
  




The JFMCC network topology was changed from the baseline scenario to accommodate the 
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Table 5. Alternative 3 Link Report 
 
Alt_4_DiffServ and Alt_6_Priority_Queuing 





The network topology for the Alternative was the same as that used in Alternative 0.  However, 
DiffServ was used at the router interfaces.  Traffic was marked differently for this scenario.  











Table 6. Alternative 4 and Alternative 6 Application Traffic Markings 
  







H2%+3:Q5+;B* H2%+3:Q5+;6* 6ECR* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;6* H2%+3:Q5+;$* 6ECR* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q@;?55* H2%+3:Q5+;$* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;6* H2%+3:Q@;?55* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;B* H2%+3:Q@;?55* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q@;?55* H2%+3:Q5+;$* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;B* H2%+3:Q5+;$* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;6* H2%+3:Q@;?55* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q5+;B* H2%+3:Q@;?55* BDCC* -0"(&&'"(%"--:*
H2%+3:Q@;?55* H2%+3:Q5@+;%=-,31(* BEEEEEE* BEEEI0-(S*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%!3U80"%!&'()"* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!'-!3CDEE* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ<=+5>?%"3%@;?55* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!'-!3CDEE* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ<=+5>?%"3%5+;$* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ<=+5>?%"3%5+;6* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%)!%V#U!!* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%)!%13F"(1* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%)!%!&'()"* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%)!%13F"(1* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;BQ!"#B%!3U80"%-(1/(1* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%!3U80"%!&'()"* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!'-!3CDEE* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q<=+5>?%"3%@;?55* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!'-!3CDEE* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q<=+5>?%"3%5+;$* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q<=+5>?%"3%5+;B* 6ECR* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%)!%V#U!!* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%)!%13F"(1* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%)!%13F"(1* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%)!%!&'()"* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;6Q!"#6%!3U80"%-(1/(1* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q@;?55Q?>5%-(1/(1* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q@;?55%5>?I=+%J>K+LJ* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q@;?55Q<=+5>?%+>%5+;6* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q@;?55%5>?I=+%J>K+LJ* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q@;?55Q@;?55%5>?I=+%J>K+LJ* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q<=+5>?%+>%5+;$* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q@;?55Q@;?55%5>?I=+%J>K+LJ* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q<=+5>?%+>%5+;B* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q@;?55QV#U!!%)!%13"F(1* H2%+3:Q@;?55QV#U!!%)!%-(1/(1* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q@;?55Q-0"!3U%)!%!"#6* H2%+3:Q@;?55QV#U!!%)!%13"F(1* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q@;?55QV#U!!%)!%13"F(1* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q-0"!3U%)!%!"#B* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q@;?55QV#U!!%)!%13"F(1* H2%+3:Q@;?55Q-0"!3U%)!%!"#$* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5@+;%=-,31(Q5@+;%=<A>JL%<LJTLJ* H2%+3:Q5@+;%=-,31(Q5@+;%MDED* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%!3U80"%!&'()"* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!'-!3CDEE* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q<=+5>?%"3%@;?55* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!'-!3CDEE* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q<=+5>?%"3%5+;B* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q<=+5>?%"3%5+;6* 6ECR* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%)!%V#U!!* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%)!%13F"(1* BDCC* 2'1(%:":*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%)!%13F"(1* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%)!%!&'()"* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!'-!3CDEE* H2%+3:Q5+;$Q!"#$%!3U80"%-(1/(1* BEEEE* BEI0-(+*
 




Table 7. Alternative 5 Link Descriptions 
 
Alternative 7 Clearing House 
 
This alternative has the same overall network topology as that used in the baseline scenario.  
However, database queries were made in a hub-spoke manner.  Table 8 below shows the traffic 
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